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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Until now, the  bulk  of the studies conducted on the relationships between efficiency wages, 
public service motivation (PSM), and effort focused exclusively on developed and advanced 
countries.  Very  little  has  been  written  about  these  relationships  on  developing  countries. 
Finding additional knowledge on the experiences of the developing countries would not only 
be  helpful  in  improving  the  efficiency  of  public  employees  in  developing  countries,  but 
would also help to enrich and expand this field of knowledge. Perhaps of more importance is 
that  this  study  were  provides  some  rare  glimpses  into  the  dynamics  of  the  relationship 
between public sector employers and employees in achieving their prescribed outcomes from 
a developing world perspective. Malaysia is taken as a case study to explore and highlight 
some common problems shared by many developing countries in improving the efficiency of 
their public employees.   As far as the author could judge (after an extensive review of the 
literature),  this  is  the first  attempt  to  analyse the relationships  between  efficiency wages, 
PSM, and effort on Malaysia. 
 
 
 
The relationships between efficiency wage, PSM, and effort were analysed and tested on the 
Malaysian public sector using Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) as a case study. This study 
found employees’ effort levels in USM during the survey period were driven more so by 
PSM  rather  than  by  efficiency  wages.  This  study  also  highlighted  a  few  policy 
recommendations based on findings of this study. 5   
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Formulating  a  competitive  wage  system  to  motivate,  attract,  and  retain  high  calibre 
employees, is not simple. It is by far the most pressing problem in managing human capital. 
Sorting out appropriate or effective wages to employees is a fine balancing act. On one 
hand, offering a low wage would generate dissatisfaction amongst employees leading them 
to engage in shirking or sabotage activities (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). On the other hand, 
paying too much could be counter-productive as suggested by Solow (1979) and Taylor and 
Taylor (2011). This is because the relationship between higher wages and employees’ effort 
is subject to the constraint of diminishing returns (Solow, 1979; Taylor and Taylor, 2011). 
According to the Solow condition (1979), employers will always find it worthwhile to raise 
the wage as long as a 1 percent rise in wages brings forth a more than 1 percent rise in 
effort. Once this ceases to be the case, employers should stop raising wages. Continuing to 
increase wages to employees beyond the optimum point will not guarantee increases in 
employees’  effort  levels.  Models  put  forward  by  Solow  (1979)  and  Taylor  and  Taylor 
(2011) predict that any increase in wages beyond the optimum point will cause the effort 
level  of  the  employees  to  fall.  If  both  Solow’s  (1979)  and  Taylor  and  Taylor’s  (2011) 
analyses are correct, paying wages above the optimum level is not only counter productive 
(atleast  at   level  of  the  firm)  but  it  would  also  be  an  expensive  and  wasteful  exercise 
because it did not give high impact to the employees effort level. 2   
This is not  to say that  monetary  reward  is  not  important. For instance,  various  authors 
(Lawler  ,  1971;  Baker  and  Jimerson,  1992;  Furnham  and  Argyle,  1998;  Michell  and 
Mickel,1999;  Molkovich  and  Newman,  2009)  reported  money  to  be  an  important 
motivational tool.   The efficiency wage analysis (Chapter Two) put forward the argument 
that the employer has to offer wage rates above the market level and this will encourage 
employees to improve productivity and reduce employee turnover, enhance the quality of 
job applicants, increase employee morale and reduce certain forms of negative behaviour 
such as shirking on the job  (Yellen, 1984;  Ehrenberg  and Smith, 1988; Krueger, 1988; 
Holzer,  1990).  In  contrast,  if  employers  pay  wages  which  are  lower  than  the  market 
clearing level, employees may have low morale and be involved in negative activities such 
as shirking and may finally leave the firm for a better-paying organisation. According to 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), employees can decide as to whether they want to work or to 
shirk during their duties on the job. Employees who are caught shirking could be punished 
by being fired. If there is full employment equilibrium and the firm pays the same wage 
rates as other companies, there is no opportunity cost of shirking because the employees 
who have been fired can find new jobs with the same wage rate immediately. They argue 
that  in  these  circumstances,  the  firm  should  increase  the  wage  rate  above  the  market 
clearing level to create an incentive for non-shirkers and a penalty for shirkers in order to 
encourage the employees to  increase their  efforts and not shirk  their duties.  In  the  gift 
exchange  model,  Akerlof’s  (1984)  argued  that  when  the  firm  pays  higher  wages,  it  is 
presenting a gift to encourage employees to exhibit positive behaviour that will benefit the 
firm.  Milkovich  and Newman (2009) explained that if the employee feels  that they are 
being rewarded fairly by their employer, then they will judge that they are being treated 
fairly and this would lead to positive behaviour towards their task and company. 3   
As mentioned earlier, if increasing wages beyond the optimum point is counterproductive, 
then  what  motivational  mechanisms  could  management  in  the  public  sector  employ  to 
harness  additional  effort  levels  from  employees?  The  primary  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to 
analyse two forms of mechanisms that could increase employees’ effort levels. They are 
efficiency wages and public service motivation (PSM). 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Scope and aims of research 
 
 
 
 
 
The relationships between efficiency wage, PSM, and effort will be analysed and tested on 
the Malaysia public sector using Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) as a case study. The 
justifications for choosing USM as a case study will be discussed in great detail in Chapter 
Three and Four. Briefly, in Malaysia, the public higher education institutions (HEIs) are 
legislated as public agencies. In term of salary scales public HEIs employees have identical 
pay  scales  with  other  Malaysian  public  agencies.  USM  also  enjoys  a  high  standing  in 
Malaysian  HEIs.  In  2006,  USM  was  selected  to  be  one  of  the  four  research-intensive 
universities in Malaysia. In 2007, USM was selected as the only ‘five star’ university by the 
Malaysian Qualifying Agency (MQA) in the excellent category under the SETARA rating 
system (Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2008). In September 2008, USM was selected by the 
government of Malaysia as the only HEIs in Malaysia to be placed on the Accelerated 
Programme for Excellence (APEX). 
 
 
 
Until now, the bulk of the studies conducted on the relationships between efficiency wages, 
PSM, and effort focused exclusively on developed and advanced countries. Very little has 4   
been  written  about  these  relationships  on  developing  countries.  Finding  additional 
knowledge  on  the  experiences  of  developing  countries  would  not  only  be  helpful  in 
improving  the  efficiency  of  their  public  employees,  but  would  also  enrich  and  make  a 
significant contribution to the current efficiency wage and PSM literature. As far  as the 
author could judge (after an extensive review of the literature), this is the first attempt to 
analysis the relationships between efficiency wage, PSM, and effort on Malaysia. 
 
 
 
The thesis has two aims. The first is to examine the relationship between efficiency wage 
and effort. While the second aim traces the impact of PSM on effort. In doing so, it will 
seek to address several research questions: 
 
 
1. Does the Malaysian government pay efficiency wages? 
 
2. How much should the Malaysian government pay in order to raise the effort 
levels of its public sector workers by one percent? 
3. Is PSM associated with changes in effort in the Malaysian experience? 
 
4. Will higher PSM levels result in higher effort levels? 
 
 
 
 
1.3  Method 
 
 
 
This case study is divided into two parts. The first part explores the relationship between 
efficiency wage and effort using Taylor and Taylor (2011) framework. The methodology 
and data used to analyse this relationship is covered in Chapter Four. Here, it seeks to 
answer two specific questions: (1) does the Malaysian government pay efficiency wages to 
public HEIs employees?, and (2) how much should the Malaysian government pay in order 
to raise the effort levels of its public HEIs employees by one percent? 5   
The second part employs the method put forward by Taylor and Taylor (2011) to quantify 
the magnitude of the relationship between PSM and effort. The PSM variable is derived 
from Perry’s (1996) set of survey questionnaires to be conducted on a random sample of 
USM’s employees. In addition, two additional questions are included to measure USM’s 
employee efforts and their perception on the importance of monetary reward.   This is to 
complement the approach utilised by Taylor and Taylor (2011). 
 
 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
 
 
This  thesis  consists  of  five  chapters  and  eleven  appendices.  The  information  in  the 
appendices  pertained  to  the  formulation  of  the  research  methodologies  adopted  in  this 
thesis. Chapter One provides a brief account of the nature and aims of the thesis and the 
methodological  frameworks  to  conduct  the  study.  Chapter  Two  presents  the  theoretical 
basis for examining the relationships between efficiency wage, PSM and effort, followed 
by a brief  survey of  the  efficiency wage and PSM literature. Chapter Three  provides  a 
background for the analysis to be conducted in Chapter Four. The chapter begins with an 
overview of the Malaysian government and its bureaucracy. It discusses the development of 
HEIs, followed by a critical evaluation of the remuneration system in the Malaysian public 
service  and  the  public  HEIs.  Chapter  Four  outlines  the  methodological  frameworks 
employed in this thesis to examine the relationships between efficiency wage, PSM, and 
effort on Malaysia’s public HEIs employees. Finally, Chapter Five offers a summary of the 
findings  with  reference  to  the  relevant  models  (put  forward  in  Chapter  Two),  policy 
implications, and some suggestions for further research. 6   
Chapter 2 : Theoretical Framework of Study 
 
 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
 
 
Formulating appropriate  and effective  motivational tools to increase the  effort levels  of 
employees is not an easy task. In the public sector, such task is made even more difficult 
due  to  the  characteristics  of  public  goods.  Since  the  public  sector  constitutes  a  large 
proportion  of  the  aggregate  economy,  it  is  important  for  scarce  resources  that  are 
channelled into the public sector to be utilised in the most efficient manner to minimise the 
‘crowding-out” effects. Like other services sectors, the labour component of the production 
structure in the public sector is the main source of efficiency gains. The primary aim of this 
chapter is to provide the theoretical framework to explore the efficiency gains that could be 
derived  from  labour  input.  This  framework  will  then  be  employed  in  Chapter  Four  to 
examine  the  Malaysian  experience  based  on  a  case  study  of  USM’s  employees.      As 
mentioned earlier, this study focuses on two types of motivational drivers – extrinsic and 
intrinsic – in influencing employees’ effort at USM. The extrinsic motivational driver is 
linked to monetary reward in the form of efficiency wages (Taylor and Taylor, 2011), and 
the intrinsic motivational driver takes the form of PSM (Perry and Wise, 1990). 7   
2.2   Extrinsic Motivators: Efficiency wages 
 
 
 
 
The concept of efficiency wages was first applied in the economic development literature. 
Leibenstein (1957) proposed that it is beneficial for firms in developing countries to pay 
workers higher wages that are above the traditional Marx (1965) “subsistence wage” levels. 
In doing so, workers in developing economies could consume higher quantity and quality 
of food, which in the process, would improve their health and well-being. Because healthy 
workers will bring forth higher productivity, firms that have healthy workers are in a far 
better position to secure higher profit than firms with poorly nourished workers. A study by 
Strauss (1986), for instance, reinforced the need for firms in developing countries to pay 
their workers efficiency wages.  Strauss (1986) estimated that an increase of 10 per cent in 
caloric intake increased workers’ productivity by 3.4 percent. 
 
 
 
It was during the early 1980s that the literature on efficiency wages was expanded to and 
accepted by disciplines outside economics. The new Keynesian school of thought played a 
major role in expanding the literature on efficiency wages. For many new Keynesians such 
as Solow (1979), Akerlof and Yellen (1986), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and Taylor and 
Taylor  (2011),  the  labour  market  is  not  an  impersonal  and  mechanical  instrumental 
institution,  as  prescribed  by  the  classical  and  neoclassical  input-output  production 
frameworks. Neither should the labour bargaining process (as stipulated by the orthodox 
economics) be confined exclusively to solving the equilibrium intersection in a supply and 
demand  curve. Rather,  the labour market is far more  complex  than  that,  with multiple 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ forces (internal and external) acting on the workers to shape their values, 8   
attitudes,  and  behavioural  norms  and  in  turn  shape  their  actions  in  response  to  the 
workplace (Leibenstein, 1990). 
 
 
 
In  the  new  Keynesian  world,  productivity  is  inextricably  connected  with  employees’ 
 
perceptions  of  fair  treatment  by their  employers  while  performing  their  duties  (Solow, 
 
1979; Akerlof, 1982,1984). The core principle of ‘scientific management’ (Taylor, 1911) 
that  employees  and  their  productivity could  be  extensively  managed  by  employers  was 
challenged by the new Keynesians in that total control of the workforce by the employer is 
virtually  impossible.  Monitoring  employee  performance  is  costly,  time  consuming  and 
difficult,  and  more  often,  counter-productive.  Frey  (1993),  for  instance,  argued  that  an 
increase in monitoring or intense supervision of the employees’ work  activities is often 
interpreted as a lack of trust by the management towards them. Employees could respond 
by  engaging  shirking  or  sabotage  activities  (Akerlof  and  Yellen,  1990).  Garcia-Prado’s 
(2005) study on public physicians found that intensive monitoring had a negative impact on 
employees who were already highly motivated. In addition to the problems associated with 
close monitoring of employees’ work, there are other issues associated with reliability of 
information collected from the monitoring activity and incomplete contracts (Leibenstein, 
1976). Past studies have advanced a variety of approaches to explain and understand the 
strategic  behavioural  patterns  between  employers  and  employees  in  maximising  each 
other’s benefit (Leibenstein, 1976; Akerlof , 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Leibenstein 
(1982), for instance, put forward the doctrine of X-efficiency, which includes a pressure 
and effort relationship that is based on the Yerkes-Dodson law (1908) to shed further light 
on this behavioural pattern. 9   
The logic behind  Leibenstein’s  (1982) X-efficiency analysis is that individuals  are self- 
selective and contracts between employers and employees are incomplete. As such, there is 
a huge potential for inefficiency to arise due to the nature of asymmetric information – a 
situation whereby one party (usually the employees) posses information not available to the 
other (employers) resulting in adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  In order to 
minimise  X-inefficiency  brought  about  by  asymmetric  information,  Leibenstein  (1966, 
1976, 1982) suggested that some form of pressure (Yerkes-Dodson law) needs to be applied 
in an incremental manner in order to push upwards the effort levels of workers, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Relationship between Pressure and Effort 
 
 
Effort 
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Source : Taylor and  Taylor , 2003, p.76 
 
 
 
 
As indicated by Figure 2.1, effort can be increased (hence reducing X-inefficiency) by a 
rise in pressure. At low pressure,   , individuals will exert low effort equivalent to   . 
Here,  the  ratio  of  optimal  to  non-optimal  decisions  is  low.  This  ratio  increases  as  the 10   
intensity builds up until point B, which represents the optimal level of effort, E, for the 
pressure   .    is the  self-selective point  which approximates  utility maximisation  of  a 
worker (Leibenstein,1982). Beyond this point (B), increasing the amount of pressure causes 
the  ratio  of  optimal  to  non-optimal  decisions  to  decline,  and  effort  will  deteriorate. 
According  to  Leibenstein  (1982),  it  is  the  amount  of  pressure  that  will  determine  the 
behaviour of an individual employee. Leibenstein (1982) argued that there are two types of 
pressures.  It  could  come  from  within  an  individual  (intrinsic)  or  from  the  external 
environment (extrinsic) in which the organisation and workers are situated. 
 
 
 
An  important  implication  of  the  X-efficiency  hypothesis  (Leibenstein,  1982)  is  that 
monetary value could be used as a means to pressure employees to increase their effort 
levels. The core idea of the new Keynesian efficiency wage paradigm is based on the notion 
that paying higher wage rates above the market clearing level will lead to an increase in the 
diligence and effort of the employees (Solow, 1979). This is contrary to what the classical 
Walrasian labour market analysis is saying. In a Walrasian labour market, employees are 
indifferent about losing their jobs since identical jobs are immediately available (assuming 
there is full employment).If the only way firms could punish their employees who shirk 
(exerting low effort level) is by terminating their employment contracts, employees in such 
a labour market will not have the incentive to exert higher effort level. But according to the 
efficiency wage paradigm, if firms pay more than the market-clearing wage, their jobs will 
become  more  valuable.  By  paying  higher  wages,  shirking  has  become  an  expensive 
activity. Workers may choose to exert higher effort levels because  they will  be caught if 
involve in shirking activities. They do so for the fear of losing that wage premium. Paying 
wages lower than market clearing level could also lower employees’ morale, causing them 11   
to leave the  firm for better-paying organisations (Yellen, 1984; Krueger, 1988; Holzer, 
 
1990). Furthermore,  if  higher  ability  workers have higher  reservation  wages,  offering  a 
higher  wage  raises  the  average  quality  of  the  applicant  pool  (Foster  and  Wan,  1984; 
Shapiro  and  Stiglitz,  1984;  Akerlof  and  Yellen,  1986),  and  reduces  employee  turnover 
(Yellen, 1984;  Ehrenberg  and  Smith, 1988; Krueger, 1988; Holzer, 1990). More recently, 
Gerhart and Rynes (2003) wrote about the benefits of paying efficiency wages through the 
‘incentive’  and ‘sorting’ effects. The  former occurs through the production of a  greater 
level of effort among existing employees while the latter happens when new employees of 
high calibre are recruited. 
 
 
 
Akerlof (1984) broadened the efficiency wage analysis by rationalising that employees will 
work  harder  (exerting  higher  effort  levels)  if  they  perceive  that  they  are  being  treated 
relatively well by their employers. Akerlof (1984) argued that employees will interpret the 
high wages as gifts from their firms and respond by engaging in behaviours that benefit 
their firms. Paying higher wages is also argued to increase the employees’ loyalty to the 
firms and consequently raise their willingness to exert higher effort levels (Ehrenberg and 
Smith, 1988; Krueger, 1988; Holzer, 1990). 12   
2.2.1 A Simple Efficiency Wage Model 
 
The  relationship  between  effort  and  wages  as  proposed  by  Solow  (1979)  can  be 
summarised as follows: 
 
 
 
 
(2.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Effort (E) per worker i is driven by the ratio of         ,the wage in the firm, and        which is 
the expected prevailing wage outside the firm and e is the efficiency wage ratio. This ratio e 
encapsulates or measures the worker’s effort. Ceteris paribus, the larger the relative wage 
premium, the greater will be the effort exerted. A ratio, e, with a value of above 1 implies 
that the firm is paying an efficiency wage, and vice versa. 
 
 
 
Several  studies  have  reported  a  significant  relationship  between  efficiency  wages  and 
employees’ effort (Kruger  and Summer , 1988; Katz and Summer,1989; Wadhawani and 
Wall, 1991).  The classic example of this relationship is drawn from the 1914 Ford Motor 
Company case. In 1914, the Ford Motor Company decided to pay Ford workers $5, which 
was approximately double the wage that was previously paid to them. The result was an 
increase  in  the  workers’  productivity  by  about  55  percent  (Raff  and    Summer,  1987). 
Studies carried out by Kohli (1988), Huang et al. (1998) and Goldsmith et al. (2000) found 
positive  relationship  between  efficiency  wages  and  employees’  effort.  For  instance, 
Goldsmith et al. (2000) reported that ‘receiving an efficiency wage enhances a person’s 
effort and that person providing greater effort earn higher wages’ (p.351). Huang et al. 
(1998) surveyed 18 manufacturing firms in the US, covering the period from 1986 to 1991, 13 
 
and found that paying efficiency wage did increase the workers’ productivity.    Similarly, 
Kohli  (1988)  reported a  wage  accelerated  effect  amongst  the  workers in  manufacturing 
industries in the US where the effort of employees depended on the rate of wage change. 
 
 
 
Although  most  research  on  the  effects  of  efficiency  wages  were  conducted  on  private 
organisations,  the  few  studies  on  the  public  sector  have  shown  consistencies  with  the 
efficiency  wage  hypothesis.     For  instance,  Lindsay  (2009)     reported  that  a  police 
department in the United States offered a wage premium to their officers (despite the fact 
that the police department was not profit oriented)   in order to boost morale and to deter 
them  from  leaving  for  better-paying  organisations.      Lindsay  (2009)      provided  some 
empirical evidence on a positive correlation between employees’ effort and high wages. 
Davis and Gabris (2008), using a salary and fringe benefit survey and a reputational quality 
questionnaire, examined the impact of efficiency wage on workers’ performance in various 
municipalities located throughout the Chicago suburban metropolitan area (SMA).   They 
found that wages were positively related to service quality; high wage levels contributed to 
an increase in service quality.   Leavitt and Morris (2008) conducted interviews with the 
human resource directors of the city council at the Seven Hampton Road Virginia. They 
found that the council implemented a market based pay system as one of the strategies to 
attract and retain a highly qualified workforce. 
 
 
 
Taylor and  Taylor  (2011) examined the relationship between  wages  and effort amongst 
public sector employees in 15 selected countries, which included Australia and the United 
State.  They found  a  positive  correlation  between  wages  and  effort.     On  average,  they 
estimated that a rise of 0.24 per cent on public sector employees’ wages was associated 14 
 
with  a  one  per  cent  rise  in  the  effort  levels  of  employees.  Taylor  and  Taylor’s  (2011) 
findings supported the previous findings by Rainey (1982), Gabris and Simo (1995) and 
Crewson (1997), in that wages played an important role in the motivation and performance 
levels of public sector employees. 
 
 
 
However, the positive relationship between effort and wages cannot go on indefinitely, as 
shown in Figure 2.2. This is because the relationship between higher wages and effort is 
subject to the constraint of diminishing returns (Solow, 1979). Although each increment of 
effort can  be generated  by increasing wages, beyond  the maximum effort  level,   *,  at 
point B, successive increase in wages will lead to a fall in effort. Once      is at its optimum 
(point B), which is also known as the Solow Condition, it will be counter-productive to 
continue to increase wages. Solow (1979) proposed ratio (e) to be unity or 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The Effort and Wage relationship: The Solow Condition 
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Source:  Adapted from  Layard,  Nickell and Jackman,1991, p.152 15 
 
Hence, the maximum or optimum amount of wages that should be paid to be the employees 
is   *  to produce the maximum amount of effort,   *.   * is therefore the efficiency
 
wage – a wage that could increase the employee’s productivity by extracting the maximum 
 
amount of effort. 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, Taylor and Taylor (2011) proposed that the effort function has diminishing 
returns built in, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure  2.3: The relationship between effort and wages 
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Taylor and Taylor (2011) explain that when the wage is at Wn* (which is greater than Wo), 
workers are motivated to exert a high effort level for fear of losing their job and wage 
premium. However, the positive relationship between wages and effort may not continue 
beyond the optimum point B, which represents the equilibrium point of En* for effort and 
Wn* for wages, because beyond this point, any increase in wages will cause the effort level 
of the employees to fall. 16 
 
According to Taylor and Taylor (2011), there are two possible reasons for the reduction in 
effort despite an increase in wages. One is linked to the notion of the backward bending 
labour supply curve. The other can be explained by intrinsic motives in the form of PSM 
(Taylor and Taylor, 2011) which will be discussed later in this chapter. Prior to that, it is 
appropriate for the following sections to provide a brief overview of the backward bending 
labour supply curve. In doing so, the analysis of the relationship between wage and effort is 
more complete. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 The Backward Bending Labour Supply Analysis 
 
 
 
The rationale of the backward bending labour  supply curve  can be summarised with a 
 
“well-behaved” utility function: 
 
U=U (x, L)  (2.1) 
where x denotes a consumption bundle in that x = ( , and L denotes the 
amount of leisure time in that  >0. U is the utility of an employee. 
 
 
 
The employee faces two constraints. The price of the consumption bundle x, and the amount 
of time spent on working. These constraints are captured by equation (2.2) below: 
                                                           (2.2) 
where   is the price of the consumption bundle    , M is the money income, W is the wage 
rate, Z is ‘work time’ and   is non-work income. 
 
 
 
Time budget (T) is derived from 
 
T=Z+L  (2.3) 17 
 
Substituting equation (2.3) into (2.1), gives: 
 
U=u (x, T-Z) and   = -                                                             (2.4) 
 
 
 
 
The optimisation of x, L and Z is as follows: 
 
                                         (2.5) 
 
where - indicates fixed. This exposition is depicted in Figure 2.4. 18 
 
Figure 2.4:  The backward bending labour supply curve analysis 
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As  wages  increase,  the  wage  line  (origin  at     becomes  steeper.  The  optimal  or 
equilibrium position changes from A to B to C as wage increases from    to     to   
respectively. 19 
 
The Figure 2.4 shows the amount of labour supplied at the different wage rates, a, b and c 
on the supply curve S corresponding to the optimal positions A, B and C. The locus of the 
optimal points (A, B, and C) in the above figure (of Figure 2.4) generates the supply curve 
(derived from the points, a, b, and c) in the below figure (of Figure 2.4). 
 
 
 
The backward bending supply curve suggests that an increase in wages raises the supply of 
labour at low wage rates but at high wage rates, increasing wages will lead to a decline in 
the supply of labour. A reduction in labour supply is an indication of an increase in the 
demand for leisure. If workers are assumed to be utility maximisers, they would substitute 
wages  with  leisure  once  they  have  earned  enough  to  satisfy  their  current  consumption 
habits. A study conducted by Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997) on the 
labour  supply of  New  York  cab-drivers  seems  to  support the  backward  bending  labour 
supply  curve  analysis.  They  reported  that  once  the  cab-drivers  met  their  daily  income 
target, they would stop working, as reflected by the negative elasticities on their labour 
supply. 
 
 
 
As discussed earlier (Figure 2.2), increasing wages beyond point B will lead to a decline in 
effort  levels.  If  increasing  wages  beyond  point  B  is  counterproductive,  then  what 
motivational  mechanisms  could  management  in  the  public  sector  employ  to  harness 
additional  effort  levels  from  workers?  It  is  possible  that  PSM  could  be  a  motivational 
mechanism to increase additional effort level. 20 
 
2.3   Intrinsic   Motivators:   Public   Service 
Motivation 
 
 
 
The term ‘public service motivation’ (PSM) was first coined by Rainey (1982) to explain 
the specific motivation orientation of public employees. Based on a survey of five public 
agencies and four private sector organisations consisting of 150 public managers and 125 
private  sector  managers,  Rainey  (1982)  found  that  compared  to  their  private  sector 
counterparts,  public  managers  were  more  motivated  by  an  opportunity  to  provide 
meaningful public service than by monetary rewards. This suggests that public employees 
are motivated more by a desire to contribute to the good of society rather than self-interest. 
Building on Rainey’s  (1982) research,  Perry  and  Wise (1990) extended and refined  the 
concept of PSM to propose that public sector employees have multiple motives for wanting 
to  do  good.  Perry  and  Wise  (1990)  defined  PSM  as  “an  individual’s  predisposition  to 
respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations’ 
(p.368). 
 
 
 
In their PSM analysis, Perry and Wise (1990) refer to ‘motive’ as the psychological desire 
which a person feels they need to fulfil. They argued that PSM motive are categorised into 
rational,  norm-based  and  affective  motives.  The rational  motives  are  based  on  personal 
utility maximization. It centres on behaviour that serves to make the most of a person’s 
self-interest.  Though  PSM  is  rarely  recognized  with  utility  maximization,  personal 
identification motives such as participation in public policy making and commitment to a 
public program can be considered to be rational in nature. Participation in the process of 
policy  formulation  or  program  implementation  can  also  reflect  an  individual’s  self- 
importance.   In other words, rational motives may be anchored in esteem for others as well 21 
 
as needs for power and self-esteem (Wise, 2000).  These motives provide reasons as to why 
people who participate in the formulation of good public policies are actually also pursuing 
their individual needs while serving social interest. This is because individuals believe that 
their personal interests are correlated with community interests. 
 
 
 
Normative motives are based on social values and norms of what is moral and appropriate 
because  social  action  ‘combines  elements  of  voluntary  individual  will  and  collectivism 
represented by the internalization of social norms’ (Knoke and Wright-Isak 1982, p. 215). 
These motives involve motivation for a cause and an aspiration to serve the public interest, 
however it is viewed. These include the desire of doing good for people and to serve the 
public’s interest, and convey a sense of duty and devotion to the government as a whole. 
 
 
 
Affective motives refer to behaviours that are centred on human emotional responses to 
various social contexts. In this regard, motivation is based on emotion that is closely linked 
to social context.   Using the proposition by Frederickson and Hart (1985), Perry and Wise 
(1990) argued that employees of the public sector are supposed to be motivated by the 
patriotism of benevolence. Perry (1996) subsequently refers to the motives as compassion. 
Affective motives therefore refer to a desire and willingness to help others, and include 
altruism, empathy, and other prosocial desires (Brewer et al., 2000). 
 
 
 
Using this framework, Perry (1996) subsequently developed a measurement scale for PSM 
consisting  of  40  survey  items  from  six      dimensions  ;  attraction  to  policy  making, 
commitment to the public interest, civic duty, social justice, compassion and self-sacrifice. 
Using confirmatory factor analysis and reliability test, the scale was then reduced 24 items, 22 
 
combining commitment to the public interest with civic duty and social justice. The result 
was four dimensions or subscales: attraction to policy-making, commitment to the public 
interest, compassion and self-sacrifice (Perry, 1997). According to Perry, the first, second 
and third subscales measure rational, normative and affective motives respectively.    The 
fourth motive, self-sacrifice is added based on the belief that it is a motive that is often 
associated with public service, and therefore PSM. As an example of self-sacrifice motives, 
Perry (1996) presents President Kennedy’s call to ‘Ask not what your country can do for 
you; ask what  you can do for your country’.   Self-sacrifice, in this regard refers to the 
inclination  to  decline  tangible,  including  financial  personal  rewards  for  the  intangible 
rewards obtained from serving society. 
 
 
 
In addition to explaining public service motives, Perry and Wise (1990) put forward three 
propositions on the effects of PSM. Firstly, an individual with a higher element of public 
service motivation has a higher tendency to be a public servant; individuals with high PSM 
levels are likely to seek public sector employment. Secondly, PSM is positively related to 
performance; employees with high PSM levels are likely to be high performers. Finally, 
public organisations which appoint employees with a higher level of PSM are probably less 
dependent  on monetary  reward  in  managing  their  employees’  performance.  The  final 
proposition they drew upon public sector-private sector comparative research by Rainey 
(1983)  where  he  found  the  performances  of  public  managers  have  no  significant 
relationship with extrinsic rewards. 23 
 
In his later publication, Perry (2000) wrote that the PSM concept was developed to: 
 
 
 
 
1) serve  as  an  alternative  to  rational  choice  or  neoclassicial  theories  in  that 
individuals can be motivated by the goal of self-less service in the public 
interest rather than just self-interest. 
 
 
2) better understand the behaviour of workers in public sector organizations as 
most  discussions  of  employees’  motives  and  motivation  in  public 
organisations  were  developed  based  on  research  conducted  on  private 
business organisations. 
 
 
 
 
The  PSM  literature  also  maintained  that  individuals  are  motivated  by  not  only  their 
personal interest or motives but also other factors such as their socio-historical context (e.g. 
education, socialization, and life events) and motivational context (e.g. institutional belief 
or value, job characteristics).    It means that individual’s self-concept can be developed or 
influenced by various external institutions and mechanisms during their social development 
process. As such, external institutions’ values can influence individual behaviour (Perry, 
2000;  Perry  and  Hondeghem,  2008),  which  may  explain  why  the  relationship  between 
higher wages and effort levels is a diminishing one as discussed earlier. This is because the 
primary  motivators  for  public  sector  employees  are  to  provide  meaningful  service  to 
communities and they are likely less motivated by the extrinsic rewards. 24 
 
2.3.1  PSM: Empirical evidence 
 
 
 
Over the past three decades or so, numerous studies have examined the significance of 
rewards to public sector employees and the relationship between PSM and outcomes. On 
the  whole,  a  majority  reported  that  public  sector  employees  are  not  as  motivated  by 
monetary  rewards  as  their  private  sector  counterparts.  Wittmer’s  (1991)  study  on  the 
reward preferences among government, hybrid sector and business managers found that an 
opportunity  to  help  others  was  the  most  important  factor  for  public  and  hybrid  sector 
employees while pay was the most important aspect for private sector employees. Using 
three secondary data sources from the General Social Survey, Federal Employee Attitude 
Survey and Survey of Electrical Engineers, Crewson (1997) found the differences in the 
rewards orientation between public and private sector employees.  Employees in the public 
sector have put greater value on helping others and been useful to society compared to 
those in the private sector. 
 
 
 
Using  the  1992  Merit  Principle  Survey,  Brewer  and  Selden  (1998)  found  that  the 
respondents who occupied lower level positions in their organisation were more concerned 
over  job  security  (extrinsic),  while  those  at  higher  levels  were  more  concerned  about 
serving the public interest.  Houston (2000) analysed data from the General Social Survey 
and concluded that the public sector respondents placed a higher value on intrinsic rewards, 
such as ‘doing important work’ compared to the private sector respondents who tended to 
place a higher value on extrinsic rewards. Houston’s study confirmed earlier findings by 
Rainey (1982) and Wittmer (1991) in that public sector employees were found to place a 
higher value on meaningful work than high pay. The findings which were based on the 
analysis of 101 public sector employees and 1,356 private sector employees suggested that 25 
 
public service motivation did exist. Taylor’s study on Australian workers (2010) found that 
the respondents who worked in the public sector and non-profit sector employees reported 
higher PSM levels than those in the private sector. 
 
 
 
Using the data from the United States Merit System Protection Board, which had six of 
Perry and Wise’s (1990) original items , Naff and Crum (1999)   examined about 10,000 
federal  permanent  employees  and  found  that  PSM  was  significantly  correlated  with 
performance, job satisfaction, intention to remain with the government and support for the 
government’s  reinvention  efforts.      They  also  found  that  employees  occupying  higher 
positions in the organization had higher PSM levels than those occupying lower positions. 
The measurement of PSM by Naff and Crum (1999) was however limited to only six items 
from  Perry’s  (1997)  24  items.  They  also  relied  on  self-reported  performance  appraisal 
ratings rather than more objective measures of performance. 
 
 
 
Pattakos (2004) wrote about the unique intrinsic values among individuals who chose to 
remain in public service. Based on interviews with 200 public servants, mostly from the 
United States and Canada, Pattakos (2004) reported that money was not the main motivator 
for many public servants and public servants - at all levels and functions - indicated that 
they wanted to make a ‘genuine difference’ through performing their work. 
 
 
 
Alonso and Lewis’s (2001) research utilised data from the 1996 Merit Principles Survey 
which  was  used  by  Naff  and  Crum  (1999)  and  data  from  the  U.S  Office  of  Personnel 
Management’s  Survey  of  Federal  Employees  1991.  They  found  inconsistencies  in  their 
findings  because  PSM  had a positive relationship with performance  in one sample  but 26 
 
showed no significant relationship in the other sample.   According to Brewer (2008), the 
inconsistencies in Alonso and Lewis’s findings were largely attributed to the complexity of 
measuring of PSM. Nevertheless their findings suggested that PSM was positively related 
to employee effort.   Lewis  and Frank  (2002), using the 1989 and 1998 General Social 
Survey’s  data,  found  that  public  employees  reported  working  slightly  harder  than  their 
private sector counterparts. 
 
 
 
Studies  on  public  sector  employees  and  individuals  with  an  interest  in  public  sector 
employment generally were more motivated by an opportunity to make a difference than 
monetary rewards. Studies by Lawler (1971) and Rainey (1991) showed that the public 
sector  respondents  were  less  motivated  by  the  extrinsic  aspects  of  their  jobs  but  more 
motivated by the intrinsic aspects, such as an opportunity to help others. 
 
 
 
Similarly, research on university students found that those who indicated a desire to join the 
public sector were less interested in monetary rewards. Chetkovich’s (2003) study, which 
was based on data from two years of surveys on and interviews with students at Harvard 
University’s  John  F.Kennedy  School  and  University  of  California  Berkeley’s  Goldman 
School of Public Policy, found that the respondents who were keen to work in the public 
sector did not desire monetary rewards as much as those who intended to join the private 
sector. The study also found that the student respondents who were oriented towards public 
sector jobs indicated an opportunity to make social contributions as an important element in 
job quality.   Taylor’s study (2005) on 297 university students at an Australian university 
confirmed Chetkovich’s findings that individuals who were oriented towards public sector 27 
 
employment were less interested in extrinsic rewards but showed a higher preference for 
intrinsic rewards, such as an opportunity to serve the community. 
 
 
 
2.4   Conclusion 
 
 
 
There  is  little  or  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  public  servants  have a backward  bending 
labour supply curve in that higher wages will lead to a decline in the supply of  labour. 
Similarly, the PSM research has indicated that public employees are motivated more by an 
opportunity  to  make  a  worthwhile  and  meaningful  contribution  to  society  than  by  an 
opportunity to receive large sums of monetary rewards. If wages are ineffective for raising 
effort beyond the maximum point B in figures 2.2  and 2.3, as suggested by the backward 
bending supply curve, then the reported positive association between PSM and performance 
would  suggest  that  PSM  can  serve  as  a  driver  of  higher  effort  among  public  sector 
employees  beyond  this  point  B.    This implies  that  fostering  PSM  among  public sector 
employees is a step in the right direction. 28 
 
Chapter 3 : The Malaysian Case 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
Chapter  Two  has  discussed  the  theoretical  frameworks  for  empirical  analysis  found  in 
Chapter Four. Prior to that, it is useful to provide a background for the analyses found in 
Chapter Four. This is the aim of Chapter Three. In addition, the information contained in 
Chapter  Three  is  relevant  to  the  formulation  of  the  research  methodologies  found  in 
Chapter Four. This chapter begins with an overview of the Malaysian government and its 
bureaucracy, followed by the discussions on the development of HEIs focusing exclusively 
on the remuneration system. 
 
 
 
3.2   The government and bureaucracy: A brief review 
 
 
 
Malaysia gained political independence from Britain in 1957. The system of government is 
based on the Westminster model. Malaysia's head of state is the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or 
"King". The Agong is an elected monarch chosen every five  years by the Conference of 
Rules from one of the sultans within the nine Malay states. Under the Agong there are three 
branches of government namely; the legislative, the executive and the judiciary as shows in 
Figure 3.1. 29 
 
Figure 3.1: The Government of Malaysia 
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As shown in the Figure 3.1, the legislative branch is the Parliament which consists of the 
Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) and the Dewan Negara (Senate).   The Dewan 
Rakyat members are chosen from a general election which is normally held once every five 
years  while  the  Dewan  Negara  consists  of  members  elected  by  State  Legislative 30 
 
Assemblies  and  members  appointed  by  the  Agong  (Halligan  and  Turner,  1995).  The 
government’s policy making process is coordinated by the Prime Minister’s Department 
through the cabinet secretariat which is head by the Chief Secretary to the Government, the 
highest position in the Malaysian civil service. The primary function of Chief Secretary to 
the Government is to act as a main adviser to the Prime Minister as well as the secretary to 
the  Cabinet.      The  Chief  Secretary  is  responsible  for  coordinating,  implementing,  and 
monitoring  the  policies  and  decisions  of  the  government  of  the  day  through  various 
committees at the ministry, departmental and federal levels (Ahmad et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
Under the Prime Minister’s department, three central agencies play a vital role in running 
the Malaysian bureaucracy. They are: the Public Service Department (PSD), the Malaysian 
Administrative  Modernisation  and  Management  Planning  Unit  (MAMPU),  and  the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU). PSD is the central agency which is responsible for the 
personnel  management  of  Malaysian  public  servants.    PSD  major  functions  consist  of 
remuneration   management   and   incentives,   performance   evaluation,   establishing   and 
grading of posts, training and career development, pension and organisational development 
of agencies (Ahmad et al., 2003). MAMPU was established to; (1) provide management 
consultancy  services  to  the  Federal  Government  agencies,  (2)  carry  out  administrative 
reforms   and   coordinates   the   human   resource   planning,   and   (3)   development   and 
deployment for government agencies (Ahmad, 1980).  The EPU on the other hand, assists 
the  government  in  formulating  short  and  long  run  policies  and  strategies  for  socio- 
economic   development.   EPU   is   also   responsible  for  developing  and  implementing 
economic development programmes. These three central agencies are powerful departments 
in the Malaysian bureaucracy. They control the operating procedures, development budget 31 
 
and also personnel management for all public agencies. For example, the PSD has the final 
say  in  the  terms  of  remunerations  for  all  public  agencies  especially  with  regard  to 
permanent and pensionable posts (Ahmad et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
In order to ensure independence and neutrality in the selection process of public servants, 
the Public Service Commission (PSC) was established by the  government  to select and 
recruit  public  employees.  However,  the  PSC  role  on  this  matter  is  limited  only  to  the 
federal and state posts, and not the statutory bodies. This is because the statutory bodies 
have their own selection committees to make decisions on employees’ selections (Ahmad et 
al., 2003). 
 
 
 
The Malaysian government consists of federal, state and local governments. In 2010, the 
Malaysian  government  machineries  consisted  of  25  ministries,  117  federal  government 
departments,  84  federal  statutory  bodies,  249  state  government  departments,  106  state 
statutory bodies  and  143  local  government  bodies.  The total number of public servants 
exceeded 1.2 million in 2010 which represented about 10.9 percent of the total number of 
Malaysians employed.  From that number, 924,039 (74.4 percent) were federal government 
employees,  113,998  (9.2  percent),  state  123,663  (9.9  percent),  federal  statutory  bodies 
18,838 (1.5 percent), state statutory bodies and 62,531 (5 percent), local government.   In 
term  of  job  classification,  about  0.2  percent  were  in  the  top  management  group,  23.4 
percent in managerial and professional, 52.8 percent in Supporting 1, and 23. 6 percent in 
Supporting 2 (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2011). 32 
 
In Malaysia, all public HEIs are statutory bodies under the administration of the Ministry of 
 
Higher Education. Public HEIs are operated like any other government departments (Lee, 
 
2003).  In  Malaysia,  the  term  ‘public  services’      refers  to  Article  132  of  the  Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia, which includes the armed forces, the judicial and legal service, 
the general public service of the federation, the police force, the joint public service of each 
state and the education service (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004). 
 
 
 
Since this study used the USM, a public HEI as a case study, the following discussion will 
focus on the development of the Malaysian HEIs. In doing so, the analysis of this thesis is 
more complete. 
 
 
 
3.3 Growth of Malaysian HEIs 
 
 
 
The   transition   to   the   newly   elected   government   in   1957   (after   gaining   political 
independence from Britain) saw the establishment of the national school policy to rectify 
the  pressing  concern  of  “  inadequate  human  resources  constituted  a  limiting  factor  for 
economic  progress”  (Taylor,  2007,  p.164).  As  such,  there  was  a  revision  of  the  policy 
concept of education, from a mere social or political service (as initiated by the British 
colonial masters) to one that places high priority on human capital formation for economic 
development (Taylor, 2007). The development and directions of the higher education sector 
had  been  profoundly  influenced  by  the  economic,  political  and  demographic  needs  of 
Malaysia (Din and Shanmugam, 1999). Strategies reinforcing and pushing the expansion of 
public education were laid out in the various five-year development plans. In all of its five- 
year  plans,  education  was  treated  as  a  factor  of  human  capital  formation.  Figure  3.2 
summarises the role of education in the economic development of Malaysia. 33 
 
Figure 3.2: Economic and education development in Malaysia (1958–2005) 
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Second & Third 
Malaysia Plans 
The switch to export orientation in order to 
generate  new  employment  opportunities. 
The aim of expanding the education system 
was to increase the supply of semi a skilled 
labour force. 
PHASE III  Fourth & Fifth 
Malaysia Plans 
1981–90 
Export-led  growth.  The  eight  Malaysian 
universities were given a special role in the 
development  of  the  Malaysian  labour 
market. Emphasis was given to science and 
technology which led to the introduction of 
a  new  education curriculum  for  secondary 
schools. 
PHASE IV  Sixth Plan 1991– 
95 
The shift in policy towards a productivity 
driven  economy  increased  the  need  to 
develop  further  human  capital.  Public 
expenditure on tertiary education increased 
significantly during the Sixth Plan onwards. 
PHASE V  Seventh & 
Eighth Plans 
1996–05 
Human     capital     development     Strong 
emphasis  on  R&D.  Service  sector  as  the 
new source of growth – more skilled labour 
force.  Hence,  the  rapid  expansion  of  the 
tertiary education. 
 
 
 
Source: Taylor, 2007, p. 165. 
 
 
 
 
As  shown  in  Figure  3.2,  the  five  year  plans  formed  the  basis  for  rapid  economic 
development. The various five year plans played a profound role in the development and 
expansion of the national education system by expanding the supply of skilled workers in 
order  to  meet  the  rapid  changing  structures  of  the  Malaysian  economy.  In  the  First 
Malaysian  Plan  (1966–1970),  the  government  treated  education  as  a  factor  for  human 
capital development where it focused on the mobilization of resources from the backward 34 
 
agricultural sector to the modern industrial sector to accelerate economic growth. In the 
context of higher education, the rate of development of higher education during the early 
years of economic transformation was slow due to the fact that large amounts of the public 
budget were being spent on primary and secondary schools (Sivalingam, 2007).  In fact, 
there was no university when Malaysia got its independence in 1957. The University of 
Malaya  was  established  in  1959  becoming the  first  public university to  be set  up  after 
independence (Kaur and Morshidi, 2010). This was followed by the establishment of the 
Universiti Pulau Pinang (later known as Universiti Sains Malaysia) in Penang in 1969 with 
a strong emphasis on science (Selvaratnam, 1989). 
 
 
 
The  government  began  to  focus  on  the  development  of  higher  education  during  the 
implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970. The NEP was established as a 
direct result of the riot in 1969 with the main objective to restructure society in order to 
ensure a more balanced distribution of wealth between the Malays and the non-Malays. 
Education was used as a strategy to achieve this balance, and also to overcome the huge 
poverty disparities between the Malays and non-Malays (Selvaratnam, 1989).  . 
 
 
 
As a result, from 1970 to 1972 the government established three more public universities 
namely, the National University of Malaysia or Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) in 
1970, the Agricultural University of Malaysia or Universiti Pertanian Malaysia (UPM now 
known  as  University Putra Malaysia  from 1997) in 1971, and  the Universiti  Teknologi 
Malaysia (UTM) in  1975. Enrolments in public HEIs increased from 7,677 in 1970 to 
20,045  in  1980, an  increase  of  about 161  percent. These  newly established universities 
could not accommodate the rising demand (brought about by the rapid population growth), 35 
 
and as such approximately 40,000 Malaysians within the age group of 19 to 24 years of age 
pursued higher education abroad in 1980 (Sivalingam, 2007). 
 
 
 
During  the  Fourth  Malaysia  Plan  period  (1981–1985),  the  education  sector  increased 
rapidly due to a change in the development policy towards export-oriented industries and 
modernization  of  the  modern  industrial  sector.  Under  Prime  Minister  Dr.  Mahathir 
Mohamed,  the  government  introduced  various  plans  in  order  to  accelerate  economic 
growth.  Amongst  the  important  programmes  introduced  by  the  government  was  the 
implementation  of  the  Heavy  Industry  Corporation  and  the  privatisation  policy.  This 
resulted in high demand for skilled workers (Sato, 2007). The government responded to the 
needs of higher education by establishing the  International Islamic University (UIA) in 
1983 and the  Northern University of Malaysia  or Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM) in 
 
1984. As a result, the enrolment of students at local public HEIs increased from 20,045 in 
 
1980 to 60,030 in 1990, an increase of 200 percent. 
 
 
 
 
During the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Malaysia Plans period, Malaysia’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) grew, on average above 8 per cent per year make Malaysia as an upper- 
middle income country with  a per  capita income of US$4530 (in the late 1990s).  This 
growth of income had a positive effect on the level and structure of higher education in 
Malaysia (Wilkinson and Yussof, 2005). 36 
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The Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001–2005) continued to reflect the importance of education in 
human capital formation: 
 
During the plan period, human resource development continued to be given priority in 
support of the implementation of a productivity-driven growth, which required highly 
skilled,  trainable  and  knowledgeable  manpower.  Emphasis  continued  to  be  given  to 
increase accessibility to education at all levels in line with the democratization of the 
education  policy.  In  addition,  the  education  and  training  programmes  focused  on 
improving the quality of teaching and learning materials, teacher training and education 
support services (Malaysia, 2001, p. 98). 
 
 
 
As a result of the rapid expansion of the public education sector, education expenditure had 
increased significantly since the mid-1960s as shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Total government education allocation, Malaysia, 1966–2005 
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Source: Taylor, 2007, p.166. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the total education allocation increased from RM470.8 million in the 
 
1966–1970  period  to  RM17,  948  million  during  1995–2000.  The  education  allocation 37 
 
further increased for the 2001–2005 period to RM18 660 million. Allocations for education 
are constantly high and ranged between 13 to 20 per cent of total government expenditure,
i 
and between 4 to 6 per cent of GDP, as shown in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Education expenditure, Malaysia, 1965–2003 
 
 
 
Year  % of Government 
Total expenditure    
% of education 
Expenditure to GDP    
1965  18.9  4.6 
1970  18.1  4.3 
1975  19.4  6.3 
1980  13.2  5.4 
1985  15.2  6.3 
1990  17.9  5.9 
1995  14.5  5.3 
2000  22.8  3.7 
2003    25.2    5.0    
 
 
Source: Taylor, 2007, p.167 
. 
 
 
 
Higher education experienced a larger increase in allocation as compared to primary and 
secondary education, especially from the Fourth Malaysia Plan period (1981–85), which 
shows the development in the economy and the demands for a skilled labour force. This is 
shown in Table 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i.  For the OECD area education expenditure averaged 5.2 per cent of total government expenditure for the 
period 1965-1999, compared to 17.9 per cent for Malaysia over the same period. 38 
 
Table 3.2: Shares in public expenditure for the various education sectors, Malaysia, 
1966–2005 (percent) 
 
 
 
1966–  1971–  1976–  1981–  1986–  1991–  1996–  2001– 
   70   75   80   85   90   95   00   05    
Primary  14.8  14.8  19.6  16.9  14.9  16.2  16.8  15.5 
Secondary  51.5  41.8  18.8  24.6  14.1  22.3  25.7  17.5 
Technical  8.5  11.6  4.1  6.5  13.2  5.7  3.6  8.6 
University 
Teacher 
training 
8.2 
 
7.7 
23.5 
 
0.8 
43.9 
 
7.2 
45.7 
 
3.4 
49.3 
 
5.4 
42.8 
 
2.4 
35.6 
 
5.6 
47.7 
 
1.6 
Other                 
  programmes   9.3   7.5   6.4   2.9   3.1   10.6   12.7   9.1    
  Total   100   100   100   100   100   100   100   100    
 
Source: Taylor, 2007, p. 167 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 shows the public expenditure for higher education (university) has significantly 
increased from 8.2 percent in the period of 1966 - 1970 to 45.7 percent for the period of 
1981 to 1985.   The expenditure further increased to 47.7 percent for the period of 2001- 
 
2005. As a result of increasing government expenditure in higher education, between 1990 
and 2000, the government established another eight public HEIs.  By 2010, Malaysia had 
20 public HEIs which have been listed in the Table 3.3 below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3:  List of public HEIs  and year of establishment 
 
 
 
No  Universities  Year of establishment 
1.  Universiti Malaya  1962 
2.  Universiti Sains Malaysia  1969 
3  Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia  1970 
4.  Universiti Putra Malaysia  1971 
5.  Universiti Teknologi Malaysia  1975 
6.  Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Malaysia  1983 
7  Universiti Utara Malaysia  1984 
8  Universiti Malaysia Sarawak  1992 
9  Universiti Malaysia Sabah  1994 
10  Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris  1997 39 
 
Table 3.3:  (Cont.) 
 
 
11  Universiti Teknologi MARA  1999 
12  Universiti Darul Iman Malaysia  1998 (2005)* 
13  Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia  1999 (2006) 
14  Universiti Malaysia Trengganu  2000 (2006) 
15  Universiti Teknologi Tun Hussien Onn Malaysia  2000 (2006) 
16  Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka  2000 (2006) 
17  Universiti  Malaysia Pahang  2001 (2006) 
18  Universiti  Malaysia Perlis  2001 (2006) 
19  Universiti  Malaysia Kelantan  2006 
20  Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia  2006 
 
Source : MOHE, 2008. 
*Note: Year in bracket is year of upgrading from college to University status. 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 shows that government had established another six new public HEIs after 1990 to 
suit the needs of the national development agenda. The trend continued in the 2000s which 
saw  the  government  establishing  another  seven  public  HEIs  including  upgrading  five 
college universities to universities status. 
 
 
 
In order to ensure that public HEIs perform up to the mark, the government has had to 
consider a number of initiatives. For example, in the mid-1990s the government proposed 
to corporatize the public HEIs, in order to reduce their financial burden,   and one of the 
features was to increase the salary of academics by about 17.5 percent;  however due to the 
Asian economic crisis in 1998 the government revised the corporatisation plan. As a result, 
the  public  HEIs  were  corporatised by  governance only and not  financially (Lee,  1999; 
2003). 
 
 
 
Another initiative taken by the government in 2005 was to establish a committee headed by 
Tan  Sri  Wahid  Zahir  to  study,  review  and  make  recommendations  with  regard  to  the 
development and direction of higher education in Malaysia. Among the recommendations 40 
 
made by the committee was for the government to create the Higher Education Service 
Scheme, a salary scheme for academics in public HEIs (MOHE, 2005). The report was 
submitted  to  the  government  in  July  2005.  However,  to  date,  the  proposal  has  not 
materialised. 
 
 
 
In 2008, the government launched The Accelerated Programme for Excellence (APEX), a 
programme initiated by the Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) with the aim 
of  providing  autonomy  for  the  APEX  University  in  important  areas  such  as  finance, 
university management, student intake and fees. The APEX University would also be free 
to recruit more researchers with internationally competitive salaries level, thus empowering 
it to achieve its goal of producing Nobel Laureates in the future. It will also be able to offer 
better  terms  of  service  and  remuneration  to  foreign  lecturers,  among  others  (Kaur  and 
Morshidi, 2010, p.204). 
 
 
 
During  the  implementation  of  the  Sixth  Malaysia  Plan  (1991-1995),  the  government 
focused on promoting the private sector as an engine of growth and stressed the need for 
the development of skilled workers to support the Vision 2020 which called for increasing 
the enrolment ratio for tertiary education to 40 percent of the population in the 19 to 24 age 
group  by  2020  (Malaysia,  1996).  At  the  same  time,  the  number  of  students  studying 
overseas  had  increased  to  about  50,000  and  it was  draining about  AUD  $  1  billion  of 
Malaysia’s foreign exchange (Sato, 2007). Due to the increasing cost of students overseas 
and lack of places at public HEIs, the government introduced the Private HEIs Act in 1996. 
The approval of the Act reflects changes in government policy to encourage the private 
sector to be actively involved in developing the higher education sector (Lee, 1999). 41 
 
This was a turning point in the Malaysian higher education sector and the act allowed the 
private   HEIs including foreign universities to establish their campuses in Malaysia and 
become directly involved in the development of Malaysian higher education sector. By 
2001, about six private HEIs s and three branch campuses of foreign universities had been 
established in Malaysia.  The establishment  of private HEIs is  also  part of the initiative 
known as the National Higher Education Action Plan 2007-2010 which aims for Malaysia 
to be a regional centre of educational excellence and has targeted foreign students (MOHE, 
2007). 
 
 
 
As a result Malaysia has about 37 private HEIs in 2007  as shown in Table  3.4 below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4:  List of private HEIs and year of establishment 
 
 
 
No  Universities  Year  of establishment 
1.  Universiti Tenaga Nasional  1999 
2.  Universiti Multimedia  1999 
3  Universiti Teknologi Petronas  2000 
4.  Universiti Tun Abdul Razak  2000 
5.  Universiti Sains dan Teknologi Malaysia  2000 
6.  University of Nottingham in Malaysia  2000 
7  Monash University Malaysia  2000 
8  Curtin University of Technology  2000 
9  Universiti Industri Selangor  2001 
10  International Medical University  2001 
11  Institut Perubatan, Sains dan Teknologi Asia  2001 
12  Open University  2001 
13  Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman  2002 
14  Universiti Kuala Lumpur  2002 
15  Kolej Universiti Teknologi dan Pengurusan Malaysia  2002 
16  Universiti Infrastuktur Kuala Lumpur  2003 
17  Universiti Teknologi Kreatif Limkokwing  2003 
18  Kolej Universiti Antarabngsa Sedaya  2003 
19  Kolej Universiti Teknologi Antarabangsa Twintech  2003 
20  Kolej Universiti Sunway  2004 
21  Asia Pacific University College of Technology and Innovation  2004 
22  Kolej Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Selangor  2004 
23  Kolej Universiti HELP  2004 42 
 
Table 3.4:  (Cont.) 
 
 
24  Binary University College of Management and Entrepreneurship  2004 
25  Swimburne University of Teknology Sarawak  2004 
26  Kolej Universiti Sains Perubatan  2005 
27  Kolej Universiti Antarabangsa INTI  2006 
28  Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan University College  2006 
29  Kolej Universiti Insaniah  2006 
30  Kolej Universiti Taylor’s  2006 
31  Al-Madinah International University  2007 
32  International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance  2007 
33  Asia e University  2007 
34  Kolej Universiti Nilai Antarabangsa  2007 
35  Kolej Universiti TATI  2007 
36  Wawasan Open University  2007 
37  Universiti Antarabangsa Al Bukhari  2007 
 
Source : MOHE, 2008 
 
According to Morshidi et al. (2004) private HEIs in Malaysia can be stratified as follow; 
 
  Public sector funded colleges and universities such as Universiti Industry Selangor 
 
(Unisel) and University Kuala Lumpur (UniKL) 
 
  Universities  funded  by  large  public  corporations  such  as  Multimedia  University 
(MMU),        Universiti  Tenaga  National  (Uniten)  and  Universiti  Teknologi 
Petronas(UTP) 
  Joint venture or  foreign  owned universities such  as  Monash Univesity Malaysia, 
Curtin University of Technology Sarawak, University of Nottingham Malaysia. 
  Large colleges that are publicly listed such as Kolej Universiti Antarabngsa (INTI), 
Taylor’s  University  and  Kolej  Universiti  Teknologi  dan  Pengurusan  Malaysia 
(KUTPM) and other private colleges. 
 
Quality assurance of both public and private HEIs is overseen by the Malaysia Quality 
Accreditation   (MQA).   It   practises   two   audit   exercises:   the   first   is   the   Academic 
Performance Audit (APA) whose main objective is to assess the performance of all HEIs 
while carrying out their main activities to determine the level of an institution’s excellence. 43 
 
The  second  is  the  Rating  System  for  Malaysian  HEIs  (SETARA)  which  measures  the 
quality of teaching and learning at the undergraduate level in universities and university 
colleges. Using the 25 criteria and 82 indicators, the rating system has a classification on 
the relative positions of HEIs based on six tiers; 6 as outstanding and 1 as weak.   In the 
2009 assessment, out of the 47 universities and university colleges rated, 18 institutions 
achieved  a  Tier  5  (excellent)  category  representing  approximately  38  percent  of  total 
population of universities and university colleges rated; 25 institutions were placed in Tier 
4 (very good) , approximately 53 percent, and the remaining 4, in Tier 3 (good), that is, 
about  9  percent.  None  of  the  universities  and  university  colleges   was  in  Tier  6 
(outstanding); neither were they in Tiers 1 (weak) and 2 (satisfactory) (MQA, 2009). 
 
 
 
As a result of increasing the number of public and private HEIs, the total enrolment of 
students increased dramatically including number of international students. The number of 
international students had increased from 40,286 students in 2000 to 50,000 students in 
2005    and  generated  about  RM  3  billion  (about  USD  1  billion)  in  foreign  exchange 
 
(Sivalingam, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
Besides  the  increasing  number  of  student  enrolments  the  expansion  of  HEIs  also  has 
increased number of academics  from 24,127 in 2000 to 41,648 in 2007, an increase of 
about 72 percent as shown in the Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: The number of academics in Malaysian HEIs for 2000 and 2007 
 
 
Institutions /Year  2000  2007  Percentage increased 
Public higher educations institutions  14732  23567  60% 
Private higher educations institutions  9395  18081  92% 
Total  24127  41648  72% 
 
Source: MOHE , 2008. 44 
 
Table 3.5 shows that from 2000 to 2007 the number of academic staff at the public HEIs 
increased  by  about  60  percent  from  14,732  to  23,567.  The  number  of  academic  staff 
members at the private HEIs increased by 92 percent to 18,081 in 2007 from 9,395 in 2000 
which is higher than the public HEIs. One major factor constraining the rapid growth of 
HEIs in Malaysia is the shortage of qualified  academic staff especially  those with PhD 
qualifications (Lee, 1999; Morshidi, 2004). 
 
 
 
Data from MOHE shows that on average only 25 percent of academics in public HEIs had 
PhD qualifications and the situation was worse in private HEIs where only about 9.2 per 
cent held a PhD (MOHE, 2008). 
 
 
 
Although  no  empirical  study  has  been  carried  out  to  quantify  the  extent  of  academic 
shortage in Malaysia (Lew, 2009), Lee (2003) described the situation of the shortage of 
academics in the Malaysian HEIs as the following: 
 
‘Many  young  academics  with  only  master’s  degree  were  recruited  by  public 
universities  and  sent  for  further  education  and  training  as  they  began  their 
careers in the universities. The situation is worse at private colleges, where one 
can find many first degree holders teaching in first-degree program’ (p.137-138) 
 
 
 
In some critical areas such as the medical field, crucial brain drain problems exist amongst 
the lecturers in public HEIs who choose to quit and join the private sector. According to 
Mafauzy (2003) the remuneration packages offered by the government to  medical lecturers 
are not as attractive as those the private sector offers and, is one factor contributing to the 
high turnover of medical lecturers in the government sector. 45 
 
3.4  Remuneration management in the Malaysian 
public sector 
 
 
 
In the last 50 years or so, various commissions and committees have been set up to review 
and to make recommendations to the government of the day on issues associated with the 
salary of the public employees. Prior to 1976, the Salaries Commission was responsible for 
reviewing  the  salary  schemes  and  to  make  recommendations  to  the  government.  This 
arrangement  changed  in  1976.  The  Salaries  Commission  was  replaced  by  the  Cabinet 
Committee to review the salary of public employees. 
 
 
 
The  salary  commissions  (named  after  the  chairman  of  each  commission)  normally  had 
specific  objectives  and  made  recommendations  to  solve  certain  issues  associated  with 
public employees’ salary. The practice of the establishment of salaries commission was a 
legacy from the British colonial administration. In 1919 the Bucknill Salaries Commission 
was established to review the salaries of public servants in Malaya. After that, there were 
five more salaries commissions namely, Subordinates Services Committee (1920), Salary 
Commission   of   Trusted   (1947),   Cowgill’s   Salary   or   Salaries   Commission   (1949), 
Benham’s  Salary  or  Salaries  Commission  (1950),  and  Brain’s  Salary  or  Salaries 
Commission  of (1956) (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2010). This trend  continued even 
after Malaysia gained its political independence from Britain in 1957. From 1957 to 1975 
the Malaysian government established at least seven salary commissions, and for the period 
1976 to 2002 three cabinet committees were established. Table 3.6 shows this trend. 46 
 
Table 3.6:  The salaries commissions and committees, Malaysia, 1962 - 2012 
 
 
No  Year  Salaries Commission or committee  Main outcomes 
1  1962  Watson Commission  Recommended   new   salary   schemes   for 
Sabah and Sarawak 
2  1964  Suffian Royal Salary Commission  Reclassified  public servants into four from 
five groups 
3  1971  Aziz Royal Salary Commission  Revised  salary  schemes  and  other  service 
conditions  for  judges  at  federal  and  high 
courts 
4  1972  Aziz Royal Salary Commission  Revised  terms  and  service  conditions  for 
teachers 
5  1972  Sheikh Abdullah Royal Salary Commission  Revised    the    salaries   of    armed    forces 
personnel. 
6.  1973  Harun Royal Salary Commission  Revised   the   terms   and   conditions   for 
statutory bodies and local government. 
7  1975  Ibrahim Ali Royal Salary Commission  The  recommendations  made  were  rejected 
by the government 
8  1976  Cabinet Committee Report  -  Decided  on  the  entry  level  which  was 
based on academic qualifications 
-Introduced  housing  and  entertainment 
allowances 
-Reduced the number of service schemes 
-Extended  the   benefits   derived   from 
pensions to the dependents 
9  1992  New Remuneration System  -Introduced the matrix salary system 
-Introduced a  new system for  performance 
appraisal 
-Reclassified   public   servants   into   three 
major groups. 
10  2002  Malaysian Remuneration system  -Introduced   the    competency   assessment 
level 
-Introduced additional promotion grades 
-Topped up the salary points for all salary 
schedules. 
11  2012  Public Service New Remunerations 
Scheme 
The     government     has     cancelled     the 
implementation  of  the  new  remuneration 
scheme  after  a  strong  rejection  from  the 
public servants due to unhappiness of certain 
term and conditions offered by the scheme. 
 
Source: Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam  ( 2010b; 2011; 2012) 
 
 
 
 
The Watson Commission (1962) was the first salary commission established after political 
independence  to  make  recommendations  with  regard  to  salary  of  public  employees  for 
Sabah and Sarawak.    It was followed by the Suffian Salary Commission in 1964 with the 
primary aim of addressing the  unions demand  for public servants’ salary revision. The 47 
 
findings of the Suffian Salary Commission were released in 1967. The main contribution of 
the  Suffian  Salary  Commission  was  the  introduction  of  a  new  structure  for  the  public 
servants which are as follows: 
 
 
 
Category A – Managerial and Professional Group with a monthly pay exceeding RM1250 
(USD 415) 
Category B –    Executive and sub –professional Group with a monthly pay between RM 
 
700 (USD 232) and RM 1250 (USD 415) 
 
Category C –   Clerical and technical Group with a monthly pay of between RM 250 (USD 
 
82) and RM 700 (USD 232) 
 
Category D – Industrial and manual workers group with a monthly pay of less than RM 
 
250 (USD 82) (Ahmad et al., 2003) 
 
 
 
 
The  Aziz  Commission  (1971)  was  established  to  revise  the  salary  schemes  and  other 
service conditions for judges at the federal and high court levels. The Aziz Commission for 
teachers (1972) was established in response to the strike by teachers protesting against the 
unfair housing and medical benefits received as compared to other public servants. The 
Sheikh Abdullah Committee was established in 1972 to review the salaries of armed forces 
personnel, while the Harun Commission (1973) was set up to make recommendations on 
terms and service conditions for 70 statutory bodies and 120 local authorities. 
 
 
 
All of the recommendations by the various commissions and committees found in Table 3.4 
were accepted by the government of the day, with the exception of the Ibrahim Ali Salaries 
Commission.   Amongst   recommendation   put   forward   by   the   Ibrahim   Ali   Salaries 48 
 
Commission is that the government should provide public employees with similar salaries 
and working conditions to their private counterparts. This is in order to attract and retain 
qualified public servants.   In addition, the Ibrahim Ali Salaries Commission report also 
highlighted the fact that salaries for lecturers at public HEIs were less attractive than other 
jobs in the public sector: 
“..many potential University teachers had joined the civil service because of 
the immediate attractive benefits, social standing and salaries paid by the civil 
service” (Malaysia , 1975  p. 195) 
 
 
 
For example, in 1970 the salary scale for a lecturer in public HEIs was the same as other 
 
government officers on grade salary of ‘A11’ with basic monthly salaries ranged from RM 
 
1100 (USD 366) to RM 2125 (USD 708).  However, the recommendations by Ibrahim Ali 
Salaries Commission had been rejected by the government due to additional costs and the 
concern over crowding the private sector in terms of utilisations of labour (Ahmad et al., 
2003). 
 
 
 
 
In  1976  the  Salaries  Commissions  was  replaced  by  the  Cabinet  Committee  to  resolve 
matters regarding the remuneration of public employees. One major difference between the 
defunct  Salaries  Commissions  and  the  new  Cabinet  Committee  is  that  under  the  new 
Committee  the  reviewing  process  of  public  employees  salary  is  no  longer  done 
independently. 
 
 
 
The first Cabinet Committee was chaired by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamed  in  1976  to  review  the  recommendations  made  by  the  Ibrahim  Ali  Salaries 
Commission.  Based  on  the  recommendations  made  by  the  Cabinet  Committee,  the 
government then rejected the Ibrahim Ali report and as a result introduced a report known 49 
 
as  the  ‘Laporan  Jawatankuasa  Kabinet’  (Cabinet  Committee  Report,  CCR)  which  was 
implemented in 1976. Among the main features of the CCR was to introduce the housing 
and entertainment allowances as well as consolidating and reducing the number of service 
schemes to 574. The government also extended pension benefits to the dependents of the 
retiree on his death (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 1976). 
 
 
 
In 1992, the second Cabinet Committee, chaired by Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, introduced the 
New Remuneration System (NRS). An important feature of the NRS was the introduction 
of a new salary structure – a matrix salary schedule for all sectors of the public service 
which replaced the linear salary scale previously   practised. The NRS was an attempt to 
link performance with reward in which the salary progression was based on the employee’s 
performance,  conforming  to  the  concept  of  pay  for  performance  approach  (Siddiquee, 
2006). In the matrix salary schedule the salary may move in four different ways namely 
static, horizontal, vertical and diagonal; the top performers will move diagonally and get 
double annual increments as compared to average performers.  On the other hand, the poor 
performers will not get any annual salary increment for that particular year. However, the 
reward for top performers was only limited to five per cent of the total number of staff 
members in an organisation. 
 
 
 
This was a turning point in the salary structure of the public service in Malaysia. It was the 
first  meaningful  attempt  by  the  Mahathir  Government  to  make  the  public  sector  more 
attractive and stop the brain drain to the private sector (Ahmad et al., 2003). To enhance the 
implementation of NRS, the Government introduced the new performance appraisal system 
in January 1993 with the aim to establish a systematic, transparent and reliable benchmark. 50 
 
A  standard  format  of  annual  performance  appraisal  used  across  government  agencies 
consists  of  elements  such  as  output,  knowledge,  expertise,  skills,  personal  quality, 
contribution to society and informal activities (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 1992). The 
annual performance appraisal is then used to monitor the performance of public servants 
and to determine annual salary progression (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004). 
 
 
 
Through  the  NRS,  the  government  has  also  introduced  a  special  salary  scheme  for 
academics in public HEIs. It is worth to highlight here that the government took about 17 
years  to  respond  to  the  concerns  raised  in  the  Ibrahim  Ali  Salary  Commission  report. 
According to Ayudarai (1988) although the government rejected the recommendations on 
‘fair comparison’ proposed by Ibrahim Ali Report, the government in 1992 had adsorbed 
and implemented the elements of ‘fair comparison’ through implementation of NRS.  For 
instance, through NRS  the  government took into consideration the salary in  the private 
sector when making the revision of salaries for certain critical job classifications. 
 
 
 
The NRS also has reclassified public servants to three major job groups’ namely premier 
grade (top management), managerial and professional group, and supporting group.   The 
NRS has also reduced the service scheme from 574 schemes to 19 job classifications (see 
Appendix 1). The NRS also reinforced the entrance requirements into public services based 
more so on formal academic qualifications. For the managerial and professional group the 
minimum  qualification  is  a  university  degree.  Supporting  1  group  staff  members  are 
diploma holders or High School Certificate (STPM) holders while Supporting 2 group staff 
members  must  have  at  least  a  Malaysian  Certificate  of  Education  (SPM)  or  a  Lower 51 
 
Certificate of Education (SRP). However, flexibility is given while considering talent for 
certain jobs such as musicians and cultural officers (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 1992). 
Although, the NRS has brought about many positive changes to help public employees to 
adopt pro-market values such efficiency, productivity and cost effectiveness (Siddiquee, 
2006),  it  was  not  universally  accepted  by  the  Malaysian  public  employees.  The 
implementation  of  the  NRS  had  created  unhappiness  amongst  public  servants.  A  study 
conducted  by Embi  (2006)  on  the public servants  in  the northern regions of peninsular 
Malaysia  found  that  NRS  failed  to  motivate  and  increase  efficiency of  public  servants. 
According to Embi amongst the factors that contributed to the failure of NRS were the 
weaknesses of the assessment instrument as it relied on the assessment from the head of 
department  or  supervisors.  Embi  also  argued  that  the  assessor  (head  of  department  or 
supervisor) does not have the necessary skills to assess their subordinates and in fact they 
see the assessment process as additional burden. The study also found that failure of NRS 
was also due to the limited budget to reward the excellent employees as only five percent of 
employees in each department were able to get rewarded each year. As such, Embi argued 
that quota system which limits the number of staff to be rewarded has led the supervisor or 
head of department to downgrade the assessment mark in order to ensure that only five 
percent of its employees get the reward each year (Embi, 2006). 
 
 
 
After  about  ten  years  of  the  implementation  of  the  NRS,  the  government  through  the 
Special Cabinet Committee, which was chaired by Prime Minister Dr Mahathir, revised the 
NRS and introduced the Malaysian Remuneration System (MRS) in 2002. The MRS aimed 
to  increase  productivity  and  quality  of  the  public  service  by  taking  into  consideration 
several  dynamic  changes  including  the  need  for  lifelong  learning.  MRS  also  aimed  to 52 
 
provide  opportunities  for  career  advancement  through  providing  better  promotional 
opportunities via the introduction of an additional promotion grade. The MRS made some 
modifications to the salary structure, allowances and the addition of another salary point to 
the maximum salary in all salary schedules. In the public HEIs, the MRS introduced an 
additional promotion grade which is the post of senior lecturer for academics. Besides that, 
the MRS has expanded the salary scales of all salaries schemes (Commonwealth, 2004). 
 
 
 
An important element which was introduced in the MRS is the competency assessment to 
determine the employee’s annual salary progression or promotion. In this system, public 
servants were required to undergo competency training programmes which last from two 
weeks to one month. Their achievements in these training programmes will be assessed. 
Lower category employees such as the support groups were required to sit for competency 
examinations. The result of the competency assessment combined with marks derived from 
the annual performance appraisal will be assessed by the head of department in determining 
the annual salary progression or promotion (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2002). 
 
 
 
The competency assessments were not wholeheartedly accepted by the majority of public 
employees. It caused unhappiness amongst the public employees especially with regard to 
the effectiveness of this form of assessment.   As a result, after about eight years of the 
implementation,  the competency  assessment was abolished  and  it  will  be replaced  with 
another form of assessment (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2010c). 
 
 
 
Beside  the  establishments  of  the  salary  commissions  or  the  salary  committees,  the 
government also increased the salary of public servants through periodic salary revision 53 
 
exercises. For example, from 1980 to 2012 the government has revised and increased the 
salary  of  public  employees  at  least  eight  times.  For  instance,  in  2000  the  government 
increased the salary of public employees by 10 percent across the schemes. In 2002, the 
government increased the salary of public servants twice – first  through a salary revision 
early 2002 with increment of 10 percent across the job classifications. It was followed by 
the  second  salary  revision  during  the  implementation  of  MRS  in  November  2002  with 
another 10  percent  salary  increment  across  job  classifications.  In  2007,  the  government 
revised the salary scales of public employees with increments in the amount of 7.5 percent 
to  35  percent.  The  Prime  Group  was  given  7.5  percent  increment,  Managerial  and 
Professional 15 percent, Supporting 1, 25 percent, and Supporting 2, 35 percent. 
 
 
 
Recently, the government decided not to implement the Public Service New Remuneration 
Scheme (PSNRS). The cancellation of PSNRS acknowledged the unhappiness of the public 
employees.  They  are  unhappy  about  the  terms  and  conditions  offered  by  PSNRS 
particularly  when  the  top  management  group  will  received  about  a  100  percent  salary 
increases as compared to 7 percent to 13 percent salary increases for the managerial and 
supporting group (Bernama, 12 January 2012). 
 
 
 
3.5. Principles in revising the salary scales 
 
 
 
 
Regardless  of  whether  the  independent  salaries  commission  or  the  cabinet  committee 
present their findings and recommendations, all decisions on the salary revision is generally 
guided by some basic principles. Although the principles may change from time to time but 
generally there are six major principles used by the government to revise the salary of 54 
 
public servants in Malaysia (Abdullah, 1980 ; Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam , 1992)   as 
follows: 
Principle 1:             Rate for the job, where employees should be paid in relation 
to their duties and responsibilities. Hence, if the duties and 
responsibilities are complex, the pay is higher as compared to 
other jobs. 
 
 
Principle 2:              Qualification and training where the initial wage should be 
related to the minimum entry qualification and training. 
 
 
Principle 3:               The relativity and parity elements between higher and lower 
salary  in  order  to  uphold  the  hierarchy  level  of  public 
servants. 
 
 
Principle 4:               Clean  wages  (or  also  known  as  basic  wages  paid  without 
other form of payment such as allowances) - salaries should 
be in the form of clean wages for all categories of employees 
and  no  extra  remuneration  over  and  above  the  clean  wage 
should be paid. 
 
 
Principle 5:                Fair   comparison   where   the   terms   and   conditions   of 
employment  in  the  public  service  should  be  comparable  to 
the private sector to ensure that qualified people are attracted 
and  retained  in  the  public  sector  especially  for  critical  job 
classifications. 
 
 
Principle 6:               Economic factors  the  government should take  into  account 
financial  and  economic  conditions  such  as  consumer  price 
index, real wage, inflation rate and beside the government’s 
budgetary  position  and  also  the  impact  on  the  Malaysian 
economy as a whole. 55 
 
Although the economic factors play a crucial role in revising the salary scales of Malaysian 
public servants, nevertheless it has been noticed for some time that the decision to increase 
civil  salary  is  not  purely  based  on  the  economic  situation  but  rather  on  political 
considerations. For instance, the announcement of the government’s decision to increase 
the salaries by 10 percent across the job classifications in January 2000 was made just prior 
to the 1999 general election (Ahmad et al., 2003). The same situation happened in 2002 and 
2007 as the announcement to increase the salary of public servants was made before the 
general election in 2004 and 2008 respectively. In this regard, the salary revision would 
also be based on political considerations because of the reasoning that public servants who 
are better paid than they expected will surely be loyal to government (Hai, 2002). Although 
there are no written agreements between the government and public servants, on average, 
the government has revised the salaries of public servants once in every five years (Ahmad 
et al., 2003). 
 
 
 
3.6   The salary scales in the Malaysian public HEIs 
 
 
 
Like others public agencies, the remuneration in the Malaysian public higher institutions is 
subject to salary revision and others terms and conditions made by the government from 
time  to  time  as  discussed  earlier.  There  are  two  major  groups  of  employees  in  the 
Malaysian public HEIs which are academics and non-academics. 56 
 
3.6.1 Salary scales for academics 
 
 
 
In general, the career ladder for academics in the Malaysian HEIs can be divided into four 
major  classifications  namely  lecturer,  senior  lecturer,  associate  professor  and  professor 
(Falk, 2011). As a result of a series of salary revisions, the average monthly current salary 
for a lecturer in a public HEIs, has increased about 200 per cent as compared to the basic 
salary in 1970.    In 1970 the salary scale for a lecturer was the same as other government 
officers on the grade salary of ‘A11’ where monthly salary ranged from minimum RM 
1100 (USD 366) to maximum RM 2125 (USD 708). 
 
 
 
 
The salary range then increased from RM 1530 (USD 510) to RM 2880 (USD 960) in 1988 
including the  salary revision  in  1980  and  1985.   In  1992,  the  government  through  the 
implementation  of  the  New  Remuneration  System  (NRS)  introduced  a  salary  scale  for 
academics which  is known as ‘DS’.  For  grade ‘DS 2” the basic monthly for a lecturer 
salary ranges from minimum RM 1686 (USD 562) to maximum RM 3966 (USD 1322). In 
1995 the salary ranges has been increased from RM 1776 (USD 592) to RM4198 (USD 
 
1399) through a salary revision. The salary range then increased from RM 1953 (USD 631) 
to RM 4617 (USD 1539) in 2000 and then rose from RM2148 (USD 716) to RM 5079 
(USD 1693) in January 2002 through salaries revision. 
 
 
 
In  November  2002,  the  Malaysian  government  introduced  the  Malaysian  Remuneration 
System (MRS) and changed the salary scheme name for lecturer to ‘DS 45’ with the salary 
range from minimum RM 2212 (USD 737) to maximum RM 5316 (USD 1772) and in 2007 
the government revised the salary from minimum RM 2546 (USD 848) to maximum RM 
6113 (USD 2037). The latest salary revision in 2012 , the minimum salary for a lecturer is 57 
 
RM 2877 (USD 959) and the maximum salary is RM 7163 (USD 2387). The development 
of salaries scales for other job categories for academics at the Malaysian public HEIs from 
1970 to 2012 are shown in the figure 3.4 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4:  Basic monthly salary (in RM) for academics in Malaysian public HEIs 
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Source:  Jabatan  Perkhidmatan  Awam  (1970b,1976,1980,1988,1992,1995,2000,2002a, 
2002b,2007a,2007b,  2010,2012).  Note:  The  figure  shows  the  basic  monthly  salary  of 
academics excluding other allowances while the maximum salary for Professor includes 
salary at Prime Grade A (2007) and Turus 1 (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, the Figure 3.4 shows that the minimum and maximum salary scales of all job 
categories for academics have gradually increased from 1970 to 2012. Nonetheless,  Figure 
3.4 also shows that the implementation of NRS in 1992 has had significant effects on the 58 
 
.development of the salary levels for academic staff where the salary gaps between job 
categories are greater at the initial levels especially with regard to maximum salary between 
the salaries for Professor and other job categories. Besides that the Figure 3.4 also shows 
that  the  government  has  reintroduced  the  salary  scale  for  senior  lecturers  through 
implementation of MRS after the salary scale was merged with Associate Professor during 
implementation of the CCR in 1976. 
 
 
 
Apart from basic salary, the government has also introduced a few other features in the 
remuneration package for academics in the public HEIs. For instance, the government has 
introduced a special salary scale for a medical lecturer known as ‘DU’ which on average is 
about RM 350 (USD 116) higher than lecturers in other academic fields in their monthly 
basic  salary.  On  top  of  that,  medical  and  dental  lecturers  also  receive  ‘medical  expert 
allowances’. MRS also has allowed for lecturers with an excellent academic track record to 
be promoted directly to ‘Professor’ position without having to go through the traditional 
path  of  starting  off  as  a  lecturer,  going  on  to  becoming  senior  lecturer,  then  associate 
professor and finally professor (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2002). 
 
 
 
With effect from September 2010,   the government has allowed the public HEIs   to   pay 
salary for top professors (distinguished professors) up to ‘Turus 1’ a special salary scale 
which is the second highest salary scale in the Malaysian public service in order to  enhance 
the salary scale for academics (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2010a ).    Prior to 2010 a 
professor’s highest pay was at the Premier Grade A salary scale. It meant that the basic 
monthly salary for professors in public HEIs could reach up to about RM 17,000 (USD 
5666). Besides the monthly basic salary the academics in public HEIs like other public 59 
 
servants  in  Malaysia  also  received  other  permanent  allowances  based  on  their  job 
classifications. Detail salary scales for academics in public HEIs as shown in Appendix 3A. 
 
 
 
In terms of promotion, in general, public HEIs in Malaysia use the same assessment criteria 
namely,  research,  publication,  supervision and teaching activities. Besides that, they are 
also expected to do consultancy and service to the university and the community (Morshidi 
et al., 2011).  Before January 2011, like any other employee in the public sector, they were 
required to undergo competency assessments in order to get annual salary increments and 
promotions. However, as mentioned before the government has abolished the competency 
assessment  and  will  replace  it  with  other  assessment  methods  (Jabatan  Perkhidmatan 
Awam, 2010c). 
 
 
 
 
3.6.2 Salary scales for non academics 
 
 
 
 
 
The second group of employees in the Malaysian public HEIs is the administrative group or 
also known as non-academic. Under the MRS, the non-academic staff in public HEIs are 
like public employees in other government agencies. Their job classifications are divided 
into three distinct  groups: Managerial and Professional, Supporting 1, and Supporting 2 
(Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2002). 
 
 
 
In the public HEIs, the managerial and professional group consists of positions such as 
assistant  registrar,  assistant  bursar,  engineers  and  others  equivalent  positions  including 
promotion from Grade 41 to Grade 54. The Supporting 1 group includes employees (with 60 
 
diploma or high school qualifications) such as Assistant Administrative Officers, Clerical 
and others positions on the Grade 17 to 40. The Supporting 2 group consists of general 
employees  such  as  office  assistants,  drivers  and  other  positions  with  lower  academic 
qualifications in Grade 1 to Grade 16.  Figure 3.2 below shows the salary development for 
non academics from 1970 to 2012. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Basic monthly salary (in RM) for non-academic staff in the Malaysian 
public HEIs from 1970 to 2012 
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Source:   Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam (1970a,1970b,1976,1980,1988,1992,1995,2000,2002a, 2002b,2007a, 
2012).   Note: Figure 3.5 shows the basic monthly salary of non-academics excluding   allowances 
using the Administration and Supporting (N) salary scales and included the promotion posts. This 
method is adopted from Abdullah (1980). 61 
 
Figure 3.5 shows that the minimum and maximum salaries of all job categories for non 
academics have increased gradually over the period 1970 to 2012. Figure 3.5   shows the 
salary  gaps  between  the  managerial  and  professional  group  with  the  supporting  group 
started to widen from 1992 as a result   of the implementation of NRS.   The salary gaps 
continued to widen in 2012 as a result of latest salaries revision in early 2012. 
 
 
 
It is important to highlight here that in terms of promotion, unlike academic staff members 
who  can  be  promoted  to  higher  positions  based  on  their  individual  performance,  non 
academic  staff  members  can  only  be  promoted  if  there  are  vacancies  for  the  positions. 
Therefore, in the case of administrative staff the hierarchy is in a ‘pyramid’ form which 
means the higher the position, the fewer vacant positions can be found. 
 
 
 
Like other public service positions, non-academic staff members in public HEIs also enjoy 
salary increments through the salary revision made by the government from time to time. 
They are also eligible for annual leave between 20 to 25 days per year based on length of 
service  and  job  classification  and  also  medical  coverage  at  public  hospitals  which  also 
includes family members. Just like public employees in other public agencies, they can 
choose whether to opt for an employee provident fund or pension scheme to retire at 60 
years of age (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam, 2011). 62 
 
3.8  Conclusion 
 
 
 
The chapter has discussed the background of the public service sector and the development 
of HEIs in Malaysia. In order to attract, retain and motivate public servants the Malaysian 
government has established the salary commissions and committees to help the government 
in making their decisions in revising salary levels of public servants including employees in 
the public HEIs. The chapter also has discussed the evolution of salary scales of the public 
HEIs in Malaysia. More importantly, the progression of the salary scales of the public HEIs 
employees discussed in this chapter provides the data required for empirical analysis on 
Malaysia found in the next chapter. 63 
 
Chapter 4: Empirical Estimations on Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The primary aim of Chapter Four is to provide some empirical estimation in order to get a 
sense of the magnitude of the relationships between effort, efficiency wages and PSM. The 
analysis will be conducted in two parts. The first part will examine the relationship between 
efficiency  wags  and  effort  on  the  Malaysian  public  sector  workforce  utilising  the 
methodological framework discussed in Chapter Two. The second part will evaluate the 
impact of PSM on the effort levels of the Malaysian public sector employees. 
 
 
 
 
4.2  The conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, efficiency wages and PSM can have a significant influence 
on  the  effort  level  (proxy  for  productivity)  of  the  public  sector  workers.  Figure  4.1 
summarises this relationship. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual framework 
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As shown in Figure 4.1, the first part of this chapter will empirically determine the impact 
of efficiency wages on effort. In doing so, it will seek to answer two questions: 
 
 
1.   Does the Malaysian government pay efficiency wages? 
 
 
 
2. How much should the Malaysian government pay in order to raise the  effort 
levels of its public sector workers by one percent? 
 
 
 
 
The second part of the chapter examines the relationship between PSM and effort. The 
PSM  levels  of a sample of employees from  USM, a public university in  Malaysia,  are 
measured  using  Perry’s  (1996)  measure  of  PSM.  Here,  it  will  attempt  to  address  two 
research questions: 
 
 
 
1.   Is PSM associated with changes in effort in the Malaysian experience? 
 
 
 
 
2. Will higher PSM levels result in higher effort levels? 
 
 
 
 
4.3  Methodogical Framework: The Relationship 
between Efficiency Wages and Effort 
 
 
 
The framework for analysing the relationship between efficiency wages and effort is based 
 
on Taylor and Taylor’s (2011) model, as shown below. 
 
 
 
 
e =Wn/We  (4.1) 65 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, paying a wage, Wn, that is higher than the prevailing wage 
outside the organization, We, would operate as an incentive for employees to increase their 
effort  level.  According  to  the  efficiency  wage  logic,  when  Wn  is  greater  than  We, 
employees are motivated to exert greater effort than otherwise for fear of losing that wage 
premium. The ratio e that is derived from Wn/We captures the intensity of effort. A ratio e 
above  1  (unity)  implies  that  efficiency  wage  is  being  paid  to  the  Malaysian  public 
employees, and vice versa. 
 
 
 
However,  the  positive  relationship  between  effort  and  higher  wages  cannot  continue 
indefinitely for various reasons which have been discussed by Taylor and Taylor (2011) 
and  in Chapter Two. As  such, it would  be useful for employers to  have some  form  of 
indicators in order to develop an effective and efficient salary system that fosters optimum 
effort levels. The Solow condition (1979) has specified how much government needs to pay 
its employees in order to raise their effort levels, and when to stop increasing wages (see 
Chapter  Two,  Figure  2.2).  According  to  Solow  (1979),  employers  will  always  find  it 
worthwhile to raise the wage as long as a 1 percent rise in wages brings forth a more than 1 
percent rise in effort. Once this ceases to be the case, employers should stop raising wages. 
Taylor and   Taylor (2011, p. 74) demonstrated that “the optimum efficiency wage can be 
determined by working out the elasticity of effort with respect to wage”; 
 
 
 
ee = ΔlogEi /ΔlogWn  (4.2) 
 
where 
 
Δ = the responsiveness of a change (Δ) in one variable on another variable. Here, it will 
establish how a change (Δ) in wage will affect the change (Δ) in effort 66 
 
Log = logarithms 
 
ee = the elasticity of effort 
 
Ei = effort which is captured by the efficiency wage ratio 
 
Wn =employee’s wages inside the organisation 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1   Data 
 
 
 
Data for estimating equations (4.1) and (4.2) are derived from the average monthly salaries 
for the public and private higher education institutions (HEIs) in Malaysia (see Chapter 3 
for the detailed analysis of the HIEs salary scales). 
 
 
 
The   wages   for   public   HEIs   were   obtained   from   the   Malaysian   Public   Services 
Department’s website (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam). The salary scales for academics are 
based on the four job classifications, namely Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Associate Professor 
and  Professor.  For  non-academics,  the  salary  scales  are  divided  into  three  main  job 
classifications, namely Managerial and Professional (Grade 41 to 54), Supporting 1 (Grade 
17 to 40) and Supporting 2 (Grade 1 to 16). 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the Malaysian public service charter, the non-academics are 
divided into 19 job classifications (see Appendix 1), each with its own salary scale. For the 
purpose of this study, the salary data for non-academics in public HEIs is represented by 
the salary scales of Administration and Support group (under the ‘N’ job classification). 
This is because ‘N’ job classification is the core group for non-academics in the Malaysian 
public  HEIs,  as  their  job  functions  range  from  supervising  academic  management,  to 
handling human resource management and other general administrative tasks at the central 67 
 
department and faculty levels (Mohd. Akhir, 2000).   Furthermore, the differences in the 
monthly salary scales between job classifications for non-academics are not great. 
 
 
 
The average of monthly salary scales for academics and non-academics are calculated by 
using  the  average  between  the  minimum  and  maximum  of  salary  scales  on  each  job 
classification including the promotional grade on that job classification. For instance, the 
minimum salary scale for Managerial and Professional group is the starting salary scale at 
Grade 41 and the maximum salary scale is the maximum salary scale at Grade 54. For the 
Professor level, the calculation is based on taking the average of the minimum of salary for 
a Professor (Premier Garde C) and the maximum salary for a Professor (Turus 1).   This 
method is adopted from the method used by Abdullah (1980) in analysing the salary range 
in the Malaysian public sector. It is worth noting here that the average or midpoint salary is 
also used by the Association of Commonwealth Universities in their salary survey (Falk, 
2011). Following the method used by the Malaysian Public Service Department (PSD) in 
their study comparing the salaries of public servants and private sector employees in 2010 
(Jabatan Perkhidmatan  Awam,  2010c), the  calculation  of  average monthly salary  scales 
takes  into  account  the  fixed  monthly  allowances  but  excludes  others  payments  such  as 
annual bonus or honorarium.  The salary range and fixed monthly allowances of academics 
and non-academics in Malaysian public HEIs  for 2011  are shown in  Appendix  3A and 
Appendix 3B. 
 
 
 
The average monthly salary scales for the private HEIs are gathered from their universities’ 
website. The justification is that the salary scales of the private HEIs are not available in 
any other form. One difficulty which the researcher encountered while collecting salary 68 
 
scales of the private HEIs is the lack of consistencies in wages among the private HEIs, and 
also among the various job classifications in both the academic and non-academic levels. 
In addition, there are also no formal pay scales in the Malaysian private HEIs (Din and 
Shanmugam, 1999). Taking these limitations into account, the construction of the salary 
scales for the private HEIs are based on two conditions stipulated below: 
 
 
 
(i)    The  private HEIs  salary scales  are  represented  by the  salary scales  taken  from  the 
established  private  HEIs  in  Malaysia  based  on  the  SETARA  ranking  published  by 
MQA. Only private higher educational institutions which fall in the Tier 5 (excellent) 
category in the SETARA ranking list published by MQA in 2009 will be analysed. 
This means that the salary scales from other private HEIs which do not fall in the 
chosen category will be excluded. 
 
 
 
(ii)  For the non-academic staff members, in addition to the salary scales, the researcher has 
looked at their general job descriptions and academic qualifications for the respective 
positions which are made available through the relevant websites. This is to ensure that 
the salary scales analysed fall in the right category and match the job classifications in 
the  public  and  private  higher  educational  institutions.  This  helps  to  reduce  the 
differences in nomenclature or terms used to reflect the job classification or job title 
between the private and public HEIs. The same method is also used by the Malaysian 
Employers’   Federation   (MEF)   in   their   annual   salary   survey.   The   minimum 
qualification for the managerial and professional group is a university degree, while 
Supporting  1  group  members  are  required  to  have  a  diploma  or  higher  certificate. 
Supporting 2 group members are required to have at least a high school certificate. 69 
 
Just  like  the  salaries  in  public  HEIs,  the  average  monthly  salaries  in  private  HEIs  are 
analysed based on the average between the minimum and maximum salary scale of each 
job classification. The data on average of salary scales of private HEIs are gathered from 
January 2011 to June 2011 (see Appendix 4A and Appendix 4B). 
 
 
 
This study however  has not included the salary scales for the top management group in the 
Malaysian HEIs such as the Vice Chancellor or President, Deputy Vice Chancellor and 
others senior positions. Getting access to the salary scales for top management officers in 
private HEIs is impossible (due to confidentiality of employment contracts). It would not 
be  possible  to  estimate  the  efficiency wage  ratio  and  the  elasticity of  effort  in  the  top 
management group without the salary scales of the private HEIs top management group. 
Nonetheless, it will not have any meaningful impact on this study due to a small number of 
employees in this salary group in the public and private HEIs. For instance, in USM only 
seven employees are in the top management group and other public HEIs also have about 
the same number. What is worth mentioning here is that the top management group had 
been excluded in the study by Embi (2006). 70 
 
4.3.2 Findings on the relationship between 
Efficiency wages and effort 
 
 
 
Table 4.1:  The average monthly salary (in RM) and efficiency wage ratio (e) based on 
job classifications in public and private Malaysian HEIs 
 
 
Job Classifications  Public
1
  Private
2
  E 
Academic     
Professor  18525  18630  0.99 
Associate  Professor  7845  13750  0.57 
Senior  Lecturer  7101  10400  0.68 
Lecturer  5529  6500  0.85 
Average  9750  12320  0.77 
Non academic     
Managerial and Professional  5685  6800  0.83 
Supporting 1  3135  2400  1.30 
Supporting  2  1774  1500  1.18 
Average  3531  3566  1.10 
Average for  all job classifications  7084  8568  0.83 
 
 
Source : 
1 Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam ( 2007  ;  2010d). 
2 Private HEIs’s  websites 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 shows that the average e ratio for all job classifications in the Malaysian public 
HEIs is 0.83, which is less than unity. This suggests that the employees in Malaysian public 
HEIs are not paid efficiency wages. On average, academics are paid less than the private 
institutions as indicated by a ratio e of 0.77 (or 22 percent).  The ratio is 0.99 for professor 
and 0.85 for lecturer. Associate professor and Senior lecturer received much lower wages 
with e ratios of 0.57 and 0.68 respectively. 
 
 
 
The non-academics, with the exception of the Managerial and Professional group (e ratio of 
 
0.83), fared much better. The average e ratio of 1.10 indicates that non-academics in the 71 
 
public HEIs were paid efficiency wages. The e ratio was 1.30 for Supporting 1 group and 
 
1.18 for Supporting 2 group. 
 
 
 
 
Based on the efficiency wage analysis, it is appropriate for the Malaysian government to 
increase wages in public HEIs. How much to increase can be determined by working out 
the elasticity of effort with respect to wage (equation 4.2). The value derived from equation 
(4.2) is the amount (in percentage) that should be paid in order to increase the employees’ 
effort by 1 percent. 
 
 
 
Table  4.2  shows  the  elasticities  of  effort  with respect  to  wages  (ee)  of  the various  job 
classifications. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Elasticity of wage (ee) based on job classifications in Malaysian HEIs 
 
 
 
Academic  ee  Non academic  ee 
Professor  0.001  Managerial & Professional  0.02 
Associate  Professor  0.06  Supporting 1  0.03 
Senior Lecturer  0.04  Supporting 2  0.02 
Lecturer  0.02   
Average  0.03  Average  0.02 
Average of all job classifications  0.02 
 
 
 
The estimated value ee of 0.02 on all job classifications would suggest that, on average, for 
every 1 percent increase in effort, the Malaysian government needs to increase wages by 
0.02 percent.   For instance, in  order to  increase effort  by 1 percent,  wages have to  be 
increased in the amount of RM 13.98 per month. 72 
 
Table 4.2 shows that ee values vary across job classifications. The average ee value for 
academics was 0.03 during the survey period. This indicates that in order to increase effort 
levels by 1 percent, the government of Malaysia needs to raise the public HEIs wages by 
0.03 percent. Associate Professors needed an increase of 0.06 percent of wages in order to 
raise effort levels by 1 percent.  Compared to other academic levels, Associate Professors 
required the highest  increase in  wages  for an  additional 1 percent rise in effort.  Senior 
Lecturers required a 0.04 percent increase and Lecturers required a 0.02 percent increase. 
To  increase  their  effort  level  by  1  percent,  Associate  Professors  and  Senior  Lecturers 
needed  a  higher  percent  increase  in  wages  compared  to  Lecturers  and  Professors.  This 
might  be  due  to  the  higher  salary  gap  for  Associate  Professors  and  Senior  Lecturers 
between public and private HEIs. The Professors required the smallest increase in wages of 
around 0.001 percent in order to increase 1 percent of effort level.  This can be due to the 
fact that, on average, the salary of Professors at public HEIs is almost the same salary as 
private HEIs. 
 
 
 
As  for  the  non  academic  staff  members,  a  mean  ee  value  of  0.02  implies  that  the 
government needs to increase their wages by 0.02 percent in order to increase their effort 
level by 1 percent.  Supporting 1 group would require a 0.03 percent increase in wages to 
bring  about  an  increase  in  effort  of  1  percent.  Both  the  Managerial/Professional  and 
Supporting 2 groups would require increases of 0.02 percent. The data in Table 4.2 suggest 
that non-academic staff  would require a lower increase in wages compared to academic 
staff members for a 1 percent increase in effort. 73 
 
4.4  Methodogical Framework (2nd part of study): 
Relationship between PSM and effort 
 
 
 
The second part of this study examines the relationship between PSM and effort based on 
the model developed by Taylor and Taylor (2011), as shown below. 
ef = ΔlogEi/ΔlogPSM  (4.3) 
 
where 
 
Δ = the responsiveness of a change (Δ) in one variable on another variable. Here, it will 
establish how a change (Δ) in PSM will affect the change (Δ) in effort 
Log = logarithms 
 
ef= elasticity of PSM with respect to effort 
 
PSM = mean value of the Public Service Motivation (PSM) construct 
 
Ei = effort as captured by the efficiency wage ratio 
 
 
 
 
In equation 4.3, dividing the logarithm of effort (Ei ) by the logarithm is mean of PSM 
would give the elasticity of PSM with respect  to effort (ef). The ef value measures the 
intensity of PSM on effort.  According to Taylor and Taylor (2011), the larger the ef value, 
the greater will be the influence of PSM on the employees’ effort. 
 
Effort is measured in two ways. The first utilises an effort proxy derived from estimating 
the ratio between internal wages and external wages  (Solow, 1979; Taylor  and Taylor, 
2011). The second utilises a self-reported survey item on effort that is aimed to complement 
the  approach  utilised  by  Taylor  and  Taylor  (2011).  This  one-itemed  effort  variable  is 
adapted from the scale  used by  Farris and Alton  (1994), and  is denoted as ‘E1’ in  the 
questionnaire. It measures the respondents’ diligence in completing their work: ‘I always 
put as much effort as I possibly could when completing my work’. Another survey item 74   
measures the importance the respondents placed on the receipt of monetary rewards for 
their contributions to the organisation (based on the Akerlof’s gift exchange model). It is 
adopted from the scale used by Clark and Tomlinsom (2001), and denoted as ‘E2’ in the 
questionnaire: ‘I should be rewarded (monetarily) when exerting higher efforts while doing 
my job’. 
 
 
 
The PSM variable is measured with Perry’s (1996) 24-itemed scale of the construct.   All 
survey items used a 5-point Likert-type scale which range from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to 
‘strongly agree’ (5). Details of the survey questions can be found in Appendix 2B. 
 
 
 
 
4.4.1    Sample and data collection 
 
 
 
 
 
USM, a public higher education institution in Malaysia has been selected for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, USM is a public higher educational institution with a salary scale and a job 
classification structure that is similar to other public HEIs in Malaysia. Secondly, USM 
enjoys a high standing in Malaysian HEIs. In 2006, USM was selected to be one of the four 
research-intensive universities in Malaysia. In 2007, USM was selected as the only ‘five 
star’  university  by  the  Malaysian  Qualifying  Agency  (MQA)  in  the  excellent  category 
under the SETARA rating system (Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2008). In September 2008, 
USM was selected by the government of Malaysia as the only HEIs in Malaysia to be 
placed on the Accelerated Programme for Excellence (APEX). Finally, USM is one of the 
public HEIs in Malaysia that achieved an excellent report in the audit of University Good 
Governance Index conducted by the Ministry of Higher Education in 2010. The result of 
the audit has helped the USM in getting autonomy from the government of Malaysia by 75   
2015  in  the  areas  such  as  institutional  governance,  academic  governance,  financial 
management and human resource management (Sharifah, 2012, February 12). 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Study location and institution 
 
 
 
 
 
USM is the second oldest public HEIs in Malaysia. It was established in 1969. USM main 
campus is located in Penang with a land area of 591.72 acres (240.13 hectares). USM has 
seventeen Academic Schools that offer arts, sciences and hybrid courses. Besides Penang, 
there  are  three  USM  branch  campuses.  One  is  situated  at  Kubang  Kerian  in  Kelantan 
(approximately 300km from the main campus) known as the Health Campus which houses 
the School of Medical Sciences, School of Health Sciences, School of Dental Sciences, and 
a teaching hospital.   The other campus is at Nibong Tebal (approximately 50km from the 
main campus), known as Engineering Campus which consists of six engineering schools. 
The  third  branch  campus  is  in  Bertam,  Penang,  offering  post  graduate  courses  in  the 
medical field through the Advanced Medical and Dentist Institute (AMDI). There are more 
than 30,000 students enrolled in the various courses in the different campuses and this is 
inclusive  of  2000  international  students  from  60  countries  (Universiti  Sains  Malaysia, 
2008). 
 
 
 
 
Since its establishment some 41 years ago, the USM has built a superior workforce of more 
than 9000 staff members of whom 25 percent are academic staff. About 80 percent of the 
academic staff members  have doctoral  degrees  or equivalent  professional qualifications. 
There is a mix of young and experienced staff within the three research experience cohorts: 
22 percent have served more than 20 years in the USM, while 26 per cent have served 76   
between 10 to 20 years. More than half (52 percent) have served less than 10 years with the 
 
USM (Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
As a public HEI, USM is fully funded by the government of Malaysia with a yearly budget 
of about RM 850 million and more than 70 percent of the allocated budget is for staff 
salary.  The university’s governance is led by the Vice- Chancellor and is supported by four 
Deputy Vice Chancellors, Heads of departments and Deans of schools. Human resource 
management is handled by the Human Resource Management Division under the Registry 
Department  and  the  main  functions  are  dealing  with  recruitment,  remuneration,  human 
resource development and other human resource issues (Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2008). 
 
 
 
4.4.3 Sample population, size and sampling procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
The population sample for this survey is made up of current full-time permanent staff at 
USM.  The method of selecting the respondents follows closely that of Taylor and Taylor 
(2011). As such, contract or part time staff members were excluded from the respondents’ 
list.  As  of  2010,  the  university  has  8831  full  time  staff  members  of  whom  1560  are 
academic  staff  consisting  of  126  Professors,  409  Associate  Professors,  802  Senior 
Lecturers, and 223 Lecturers.  Non-academic staff members comprised of 825 Management 
and Professional group members, 3760 Supporting 1 staff members and 2679 Supporting 2 
staff members (Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2011). 
 
 
 
For this study, the sample size was calculated using Yamane’s (1967) equation as shown 
 
below: 77   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where n = sample size 
 
N= number of people or population size 
 
e= level of precision/margin of errors 
 
 
 
The final simple size is then calculated based on (65%) the response rate of prior research 
experience (i.e.,65%) (Yamane, 1967) .  The calculations were based on the following: 
 
 
 
Where anticipated return rate = 65% 
 
Where n2 = sample size adjusted for response rate 
 
Where minimum sample size = 383 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the final size sample required for this survey is, n2 =383/.65= 589. The targeted 
sample  size  for  this  study  has  been  rounded  to  the  nearest  rounded  figure  of  600 
respondents.  The  respondents  were  then  selected  using  the  stratified  random  sampling 
method based on their job classifications. This method, as explained by Black et al. (2010), 
shows  that  the  probability  sampling  produced  is  more  or  less  equal  regarding  the 
characteristics  of  each  of  the  population  sample  which  is  in  this  case  is  the  job 
classification. Details of the number of size samples according to job classifications are 
shown in the Table 4.3. 78   
Table  4.3:  Sample size based on job classifications, USM, Malaysia 
 
 
Job classification  Number of staff 
members/Population 
Percentage  Sample size 
Academic  staff   
Professor  126/8831  1.4  9 
Associate Professor  410/8831  4.6  27 
Senior Lecturer  803/8831  9.1  55 
Lecturer  224/8831  2.5  15 
Administrative staff   
Management and Professional  826/8831  9.4  56 
Supporting  1  3762/8831  42.6  256 
Supporting  2  2680/8831  30.4  182 
Total  100  600 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the sample size required, the researcher then used the simple random method 
where the respondents are choosen from computer generated list with assistance from the 
Human Resource Division, USM. 
 
 
 
4.4.4 Survey questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
To increase the effectiveness of the survey, the questionnaires have been translated into 
Bahasa   Malaysia   (Malay   language)   to   help   those   respondents   whose   educational 
background  has  been  primarily  in  the  Malay  language.  Since  this  is  first  time  Perry’s 
(1996)  PSM  scale  has  been  translated  into  the  Malay  language,  the  backward-forward 
translation method as suggested by Brislin (1970, 1980) was used to ensure cross-cultural 
equivalence of the instrument. 
 
 
 
The English version of the measure was at first forward translated by the researcher whose 
native language is Malay. The Malay translation was then checked by a Malay translation 79   
officer at the School of Languages, Literacies and Translation, Universiti Sains Malaysia. A 
back  translation  of  the  Malay  version  into  English  language  was  made  by  an  English 
language lecturer at the same school.  This version is compared with the original measure to 
check for any differences in terms of terminology and languages used in the survey items. 
 
 
 
4.4.5 Reliability 
 
 
 
A pilot test was conducted on the PSM measure.     According to Churchill (1979), data 
collection should not take place without an adequate pre-test of the instrument. As such, a 
pilot test was administered to 29 academic and non-academic staff members who attended a 
training  program  that  was  organised  by  USM’s  Training  Unit  (see  in  Appendix  5). 
Statements in the Malay and English languages were presented to all the respondents. 
 
 
 
The data obtained from the pilot test were then used to examine the internal consistency of 
the items used in the survey. For the purpose of reliability, the internal consistencies of the 
constructs used in this study were assessed through the use of Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. 
The result of the pilot test showed that the reliability coefficient alpha for the 24 items of 
the PSM scale was 0.87. The Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for the four subscales ranged 
from 0.67 to 0.79 as shown in the  Table 4.4. 80   
Table  4.4:  Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for PSM, USM, Malaysia 
 
 
PSM’s items  Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
ATTRACTION TO POLICY MAKING 
PSM1: Politics is a dirty word. (R) 
PSM2: The give and take of public policy making doesn’t appeal 
to me. (R) 
PSM3: I don’t care much for politicians. (R) 
 
 
.67 
COMMITMENT TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
PSM4: It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going 
on in my community. (R) 
PSM5: I unselfishly contribute to my community 
PSM6: I consider public service my civic duty. 
PSM7: Meaningful public service is very important to me. 
PSM8: I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for 
the whole community even if it harmed my interests 
 
 
 
.76 
COMPASSION 
PSM9: It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see 
people in distress. 
PSM10: Most social programs are too vital to do without. 
PSM11: I am often reminded by daily events how dependent we 
are on one another. 
PSM12: I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged. 
(R) 
PSM13: To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of 
others. 
PSM14: I have little compassion for people in need who are 
unwilling to take the first step to help themselves. (R) 
PSM15: There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly 
support. (R) 
PSM16: I seldom think about the welfare of people I don’t know 
personally. (R) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.74 
SELF-SACRIFICE 
PSM17: Doing well financially is definitely more important to me 
than doing good deeds. (R) 
PSM18: Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. 
PSM19: Serving other citizens would give me a good feeling even 
if no one paid me for it. 
PSM20: Making a difference in society means more to me than 
personal achievements. 
PSM21: I think people should give back to society more than they 
get from it. 
PSM22: I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good 
of society. 
PSM23: I am one of those rare people who would risk personal 
loss to help someone else. 
PSM24: I believe in putting duty before self. 
 
 
 
.79 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the results are lower than Perry’s (1996) 0.90 for 24 items of PSM and 0.69 to 
 
0.77 for  the subscales,  the results of this pilot test are acceptable because the results for 81 
 
total  PSM   is  above  Cronbach’s  alpha 0  .70  as  suggested  by Nunnaly (1978).  In  fact, 
according to Hair et al, (1998. p.118), the coefficient alpha may decrease to 0.60 in an 
exploratory research. 
 
 
 
One  of  the  main  objectives  of  conducting  the  pilot  project  was  to  examine  the  issues 
regarding  the  respondent’s  understanding  of  the  survey items  and  to  identify the  items 
which might have confused the respondents. The researcher also noted the time taken by 
the respondents to complete the survey.  The results obtained from the pilot indicated that 
the respondents clearly understood the survey items and they took about 20 minutes to 
complete the survey. The researcher also ensured that the layout and appearance of the 
questionnaire looked attractive and professional (Cavana et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
The final  version  of  the  questionnaire  is  attached  with  a  cover  letter  consisting of  key 
information about the study, such as the objectives of the study, total number of questions 
to be answered, the time needed to complete the questionnaire, and contact information. 
Other key information such as statements about the confidentiality and anonymity of the 
information provided were also stated (see Appendix 2A and Appendix 2B). 
 
 
 
The respondents were given two weeks to complete and return the questionnaire, and to 
ensure confidentiality they were not required to identify themselves. In this regard, coding 
was used only for administrative or statistical purposes. 
 
 
 
The survey was conducted from April to May 2011. Prior to data collection, the researcher 
travelled to Malaysia and arranged a meeting with the officers at the Human Resource 82 
 
Management Division, USM. The survey forms were sent out by USM’s Human Resource 
Management division on behalf of the researcher to the potential respondents in order to 
meet Murdoch University’s human research ethics requirement that the researcher should 
not have direct contact with the respondents (see Appendix 6A and Appendix 6B).    Data 
was collected from the  identified respondents in  the four USM campuses namely, main 
campus, health campus, engineering campus and Bertam campus. 
 
 
 
4.4.7  Data analysis 
 
 
 
Once the data had been entered, it was then screened in order to ensure that there were no 
errors during data entry as it could misrepresent the statistical analyses. This was done by 
using the ‘Descriptive’ and ‘Frequencies’ of SPSS version 17 statistical software to detect 
any outliers.  This  was  followed  by the  recoding  of  the  reverse-scored  items,  i.e.  items 
PSM1, PSM 2, PSM 3, PSM 4, PSM 12, PSM 14, PSM 15, PSM 16 and PSM 17 (see 
Table 4.4). 
 
 
 
Factor  analysis  (principal  component  analysis  with  varimax  rotation)  was  then  applied 
using computed variables. As suggested by Sekaran (1984) the items with loading less than 
0.50  were eliminated.  In  order to check  the outliers (Hair et al.,1998),  the  process was 
repeated a few times until the value of R-square (R
2) was above 0.50.  The data which were 
found to be out of the range were eliminated. In this survey, 41 cases were eliminated.   The 
final  cases  (n=416)  were  then  calculated  to  produce  a  mean  of  PSM  based  on  the  job 
classifications. The mean of PSM was then applied in the model developed by Taylor & 
Taylor (2011) to examine the relationship between wages, PSM and effort as explained 
earlier. 83 
 
4.4.8  Distribution of respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
Out of 600 questionnaires distributed, 457 were returned which represented about a 76.1 
percent response rate; details of questionnaires are shown in Appendix 7.  Of 457 returned 
questionnaires,  416  questionnaires  were  used  for  the  analyses  after  eliminating  41 
questionnaires through data analysis process as discussed earlier. 
Before  presenting  the  results  of  this  study,  it  is  useful  to  consider  the  distribution  of 
respondents by gender, age, race, job classification, and education level, length of service 
and campus location.  This demographic information of the study sample is found in Table 
4.5. 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Distribution of respondents (n=416), USM, Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
Socio demographic characteristics  Category  Frequency  Percent 
Gender  Male  216  51.9 
Female  200  48.1 
Age  18-29  110  26.4 
30-39  138  33.2 
40-49  105  25.2 
50 and above  63  15.1 
Race  Malay  369  88.7 
Chinese  25  6.0 
Indian  21  5.0 
Other  1  0.2 
Job Classifications  Professor  9  2.2 
Associate Professor  26  6.3 
Senior Lecturer  37  8.9 
Lecturer  8  1.9 
Managerial and Professional  56  13.5 
Supporting 1  194  46.6 
Supporting  2  86  20.7 84 
 
Table 4.5 :  (Cont.) 
 
Education level  SRP/SPM  171  41.1 
STPM/Diploma  93  22.4 
Bachelor Degree  64  15.4 
Master Degree  24  5.8 
Ph.D  64  15.4 
Length  of service (year)  10 and below  236  56.7 
11 -19  91  21.9 
20-29  71  17.1 
30 and above  18  4.3 
Campus location  Main campus (Penang)  223  53.6 
Engineering  88  21.2 
Health  104  25.0 
Bertam  1  0.2 85 
 
4.5 Findings: The relationship between PSM and  effort 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 shows the elasticity of PSM with respect to effort (ef). As mentioned earlier, the 
higher the  ef  value, the larger the influence of PSM  in bringing  about  a change in  the 
employees’ effort level (Taylor and Taylor, 2011). 
 
 
Table 4.6: Elasticity of PSM with respect to effort (ef) based on job 
classifications, USM, Malaysia 
 
 
 
Academic  ef  Non academic  ef 
Professor  (N=9)  0.01  Managerial & Professional (N=56)  0.13 
Associate  Professor(N=26)  0.46  Supporting 1 (N=194)  0.21 
Senior Lecturer (N=37)  0.31  Supporting 2 (N=86)  0.14 
Lecturer (N =8)  0.12   
Average  for academics  0.22  Average for non academic  0.16 
Average for all job classifications  0.20 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 4.6, the average ef value for all jobs classifications was estimated to be 
 
0.20. This suggests that on average, a change in PSM by 0.20 contributed to 1 percent 
change in the effort level. The results also showed that the values of ef varied across the job 
classifications. On average, the ef value for academics was 0.22, while for non-academics it 
was 0.16.   This suggests that on average, the value of the elasticity of PSM to effort for 
academics was greater than that for non-academics. 
 
 
 
The data found in Table 4.6 show that the ef values varied amongst the different academic 
levels. For instance, the Associate Professor level, on average, was estimated to have the 
highest ef value at 0.46, followed by Senior Lecturer at 0.30, Lecturer at 0.12 and Professor 
at 0.01. This suggests that the effort levels of the respondents at Associate Professor and 86 
 
Senior Lecturer levels were influenced by PSM to a greater extent than those at Professor 
and Lecturer levels. 
 
 
 
As  for the non  academics  working  at USM, the highest ef value was  estimated  for the 
Supporting 1 group (0.20), followed by the Supporting 2 group (0.14), and then by the 
Managerial and Professional group (0.13). The findings suggest that, on average, PSM has 
a  greater  influence  on  effort  in  the  supporting  groups  compared  to  Managerial  and 
Professional group. 
 
 
 
A comparison of the two elasticity values in Table 4.2 (e) and Table 4.7 (ef) indicated that 
the ef value was higher than the e value.  The trend of a higher ef value than e value was 
observed  for  all  job  classifications.  The  results  indicated  the  importance  of  the  PSM 
element in raising the effort level of public servants as compared to wages. 
 
 
 
As explained earlier, in addition to using the proxy of effort to investigate the relationship 
between monetary rewards and effort using government statistics, this study also asked the 
respondents to answer two additional questions. The result of the questions are summarised 
in Table 4.7. 87 
 
Table  4.7: Effort and monetary reward, USM, Malaysia 
 
 
Job classifications  Mean 
Effort  Monetary reward 
Academic 
Professor (N=9)  4.77  2.77 
Associate Professor (N=26)  4.00  3.76 
Senior Lecturer (N=37)  4.16  3.75 
Lecturer (N=8)  4.75  3.87 
Average for academics  4.42  3.53 
Non academic 
Managerial and professional (N=56)  4.45  3.47 
Supporting 1 (N=194)  4.39  3.41 
Supporting 2 (N=86)  4.26  3.60 
Average  for non academics  4.36  3.49 
Total mean  4.39  3.49 
 
 
 
 
As  shown  in  Table  4.7,  the  average  value  of  effort  for  the  respondents  across  the  job 
classifications was 4.39. The average value for monetary reward was 3.49. This suggests 
that the respondents across the job classifications were willing to exert a high level of effort 
while completing their task with less monetary rewards. The mean values varied between 
academic and non-academic respondents. For academics, the mean value for effort was 
4.42 and the mean value for monetary reward was 3.53. For respondents from the non- 
academic group, the mean value was 4.36 for effort and 3.46 for monetary reward. 
 
 
 
Of all job classifications under the academic group, the Professor respondents rated highest 
in exerting effort with a mean of 4.77 and lowest in monetary reward with a mean of 2.77. 
It was followed by the Lecturer respondents with a mean of 4.75 for effort. However they 
rated  highest  for  monetary  reward  with  a  mean  of  3.87.  For  the  Senior  Lecturer 
respondents,  the  mean  effort  was  4.16  and  the  mean  monetary  reward  was  3.75.  The 
Associate Professor respondents had an effort mean of 4.00 and a monetary reward mean of 88 
 
3.76.  The values collected by the survey supported those that relied on the proxy approach. 
Take the case of the Professor respondents for example, the proxy approach suggested that 
they required the lowest increase in salary of 0.001 percent to raise their effort level by 1 
percent.  A  similar  trend  was  observed  using  the  survey  approach.  Overall,  the  results 
collected by the survey on effort suggest that the academic respondents were willing to 
exert higher effort levels than the non-academic respondents. 
 
 
 
 
4.6  Conclusion 
 
 
 
This  chapter  has  described  the  methodology  used  in  this  research  to  examine  the 
relationship between efficiency wages, public service motivation and effort among a group 
of academics and non-academics in USM. It also presented the results of this study.   It 
offers four prominent findings. Firstly, the government of Malaysia has not paid efficiency 
wages  to  its  public  servants  at  USM. Secondly,  wages  had  a positive relationship  with 
effort; however the USM staff were less motivated by the wages element in increasing their 
effort level. Thirdly, the USM’s employees required a small increase in wages to increase 
their effort level . Finally, the public service motivation plays vital roles in increasing effort 
levels. 
 
 
 
The  next  chapter  will  focus  on  discussion  of  the  findings  and  highlight  policy 
recommendations, limitation of the study and direction for future research. 89 
 
Chapter 5: Summary of findings and discussions 
 
 
 
As  mentioned  in  chapters  One  and  Four,  this  thesis  attempts  to  answer  four  research 
questions. They are: 
 
 
 
1.   Does the Malaysian government pay efficiency wages? 
 
2.   How much should the Malaysian government pay in order to raise the effort levels 
of its public sector workers by one percent? 
3.   Is PSM associated with changes in effort in the Malaysian experience? 
 
4.   Will higher PSM levels result in higher effort levels? 
 
 
 
 
The findings in Chapter Four found that public HEIs employees, on average, were not paid 
efficiency wages. An efficiency wage ratio, e, of above 1 would suggests that efficiency 
wage is being paid (Chapter Two), and vice versa. The findings in the previous chapter 
(Table 4.1) shows that the average e ratio for all job classifications (academics and non- 
academics) in the Malaysian public HEIs is 0.83, which is less than 1. This indicates that 
USM employees are not paid efficiency wages. When the job classifications is subdivided 
into academics and non-academics, the non-academics fared much better. The average  e 
ratio of 1.10 suggests that non-academics in the public HEIs are paid efficiency wages. The 
findings also show that in the USM case, employees in non-supervisory positions are paid 
higher  wages  as  compared  to  employees  in  supervisory  positions.  For  instance,  the 
Managerial and Proffessional group has an estimated ratio e of 0.83 as compared to ratios e 
of  1.30  and  1.18  for  Supporting  1  group  and  Supporting  2  group  respectively.  The 
Malaysian experience is not unique. Taylor and Taylor (2011) estimated the ratio e to be 90 
 
higher for non-supervisory postions (average e  = 1.08) than that of supervisory positions 
 
(average e = 0.97) in the public sector of 15 countries. 
 
 
 
 
Academics, on the other hand, are paid less than the private institutions as indicated by an 
average ratio e of 0.77. The ratio is 0.99 for Professor and 0.85 for lecture while Associate 
Professor and Senior Lecturer received much lower wages than their private counterparts, 
with e ratios of 0.57 and 0.68 respectively. The findings of this study echoed the concerns 
raised by several authors (Mafauzy, 2003; Morris et al., 2003; Morshidi et al., 2004) of the 
consequences of paying academics in public HEIs lower than their private counterparts. 
 
 
 
The  lack  of  a  competitive  salary  package  for  academics  in  the  Malaysian  public  HEIs 
would meant that public HEIs will find it increasingly difficult to compete and to attract 
productive academics than their private HEI counterparts. The initiative, put in place by the 
Ministry of Education to improve the quality of the public HEIs, involving the hiring of 
more foreign academics (from the current 5 percent to 15 percent by 2015)   to join the 
Malaysian public HEIs  will not be esay to accomplish. In addition to the higher wages 
being offered by domestic private HEIs, the Malaysian public HEIs would also need to 
compete  with  its  neighbouring  countries  for  foriegn  academics.  Singapore  offers 
significantly higher wages to its academics than Malaysia ( Mukherjee and Wong, 2011). 
According to Rumbley et al. (2008), Malaysia ranked 11 out of 15 countries based on the 
average monthly salary of academics. The studies found that the average monthly salary of 
Malaysian academics at public universities is behind France, South Africa, Japan and other 
developed countries. A study conducted by the Association of Commonwealth Universities 91 
 
on seven countries put Malaysia in lowest rank in terms of the salary level for academics 
 
(Falk, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
Taking into account the efficiency wage analysis and the findings of the previous chapter, it 
is appropriate that the Malaysian government should increase wages of the public HEIs 
employees. How much more to increase can be determined by deriving the elasticity of 
effort  with  respect  to  wage.  The  elasticity  ee  is  the  amount  (in  percentage)  that  the 
government  should  pay  in  order  to  increase  the  employees’  effort  by  1  percent.  As 
indicated in Chapter Four, the estimated ee value of 0.02 on all job classification would 
suggest that, on average, for every 1 percent increase in effort, the Malaysian government is 
required to  raise  wages  by 0.02  percent.  The average  ee  value  for  academics was 0.03 
during the survey period. This indicates that in order to increase effort levels by 1 percent, 
the  government  of  Malaysia  needs  to  raise  the  public  HEIs  wages  by  0.03  percent. 
Associate Professors needed an increase of 0.06 percent of wages in order to raise effort 
levels by 1 percent.  Compared to other academic levels, Associate Professors required the 
highest  increase  in  wages  for  an  additional  1  percent  rise  in  effort.  Senior  Lecturers 
required a 0.04 percent increase and Lecturers required a 0.02 percent increase. To increase 
their effort level by 1 percent, Associate Professors and Senior Lecturers needed a higher 
percent increase in wages compared to Lecturers and Professors. The Professors required 
the smallest increase in wages of around 0.001 percent in order to increase 1 percent of 
effort level.  As for the non academic staff members, a mean ee value of 0.02 implies that 
the government needs to increase their wages by 0.02 percent in order to increase their 
effort level by 1 percent.   Supporting 1 group would require a 0.03 percent increase in 92 
 
wages to bring about an increase in effort of 1 percent. Both the Managerial/Professional 
and Supporting 2 groups would require increases of 0.02 percent. 
 
 
 
Although  employees  in  USM  are  not  paid  efficiency  wages,  they  required  only  small 
increments in wages to raise their effort level by 1 percent as indicated by the small ee 
values as discussed above and in Chapter Four. Perhaps in USM, PSM plays a stronger role 
than monetary rewards in changing effort levels. If this is to be the case, the elasticity of 
effort with respect to PSM, ef, should be higher than the elasticity of effort with respect to 
wages, ee.  Table 5.1 shows the ee and ef values. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Elasticity Values, USM, Malaysia 
 
Job classifications  ee  ef 
Academics 
Professor  0.001  0.01 
Associate Professor  0.06  0.46 
Senior Lecturer  0.04  0.31 
  Lecturer    0.02    0.12   
  Non-academics    
Managerial & Professional  0.02  0.13 
Supporting 1  0.03  0.21 
  Supporting 2    0.02    0.14   
 
Note: ee = elasticity of effort with respect to wages; ef = elasticity of effort with respect to PSM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data in Table 5.1 shows that on all job classifications (academics and non-academics), 
the ef values are higher than the ee values. It seems that in USM, PSM has stronger impact 
on effort levels than wages. 93 
 
Several practical and policy implications could be derived from this study’s findings in the 
formulation of remuneration packages for the Malaysian public employees. This study has 
found  that  the  USM  employees  are  less      motivated  by monetary  rewards.     They  are 
motivated  to  a  much  greater  degree  by  PSM.  Because  PSM  has  been  found  to  play  a 
significant role in increasing the effort of the Malaysian public employees, it is, therefore, 
important for the Malaysian government to focus on programmes that would foster greater 
recognition  of  PSM.  This  can  be  achieved  by  providing  appropriate  intervention 
programmes  through  the  enhancement  of  training  and  development  programmes  which 
consist of PSM values for the Malaysian public servants. 
 
 
 
It is also important for the government to consider enhancing the recruitment and  selection 
process   that take PSM into account while selecting new public employees. As such, the 
Malaysian  government  should  consider     integrating  PSM      into  the     human  resource 
management  policies  for  recruitment,  selection,  and  retention.  This  implies  that  the 
Malaysian government should consider a data gathering system to enhance and measure the 
PSM of public sector employees for these purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the findings of this study may help to enrich and expand the efficiency wage and 
PSM literature by drawing from the experience of a developing country, there are some 
shortcomings which need to be pointed out. The first is associated with the small sample 
size. This case study has only analysed  a small  section of the Malaysian public sector. 
Although   the   data   used   in   the   USM   case   study  took   into   account   different   job 
classifications and different demographic groups, this data set, however, represented only a 94 
 
small proportion of the entire public sector. Future research should consider conducting a 
study on a larger sample size from different levels of governments such as federal, state, 
and local in order to get a wider and more accurate representation of the Malaysian public 
sector. The second shortcoming involves the use of cross-sectional data, which cannot be 
subjected  to  time  series  analysis.  A  carefully  constructed  time  series  statistical  analysis 
would not only capture more accurately the orders of magnitude on the ee and ef values, but 
would also give a broader and more robust view of the relationships between efficiency 
wage, PSM and effort from a longer time frame. This is important because the PSM values 
change overtime. As such, future research should be conducted on a larger sample size and 
over time. Nevertheless, the findings of this study are consistent with the conclusions from 
the theoretical frameworks put forward in Chapter Two.  In the Malaysian case study, it 
seems that PSM has a stronger impact on effort levels than wages. 95 
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Appendix 1:  Service schemes and code for the Malaysian public service 
 
 
Service scheme  Code 
Transportation  A 
Talent and art  B 
Sciences  C 
Education  D 
Information system  F 
Agriculture  G 
Engineering  J 
Security and civil defence  K 
Law and judiciary  L 
Administrative  and diplomatic  M 
Administration and supporting  N 
Research and development  Q 
Skills/semi skills /non skills  R 
Social  S 
Medical and health  U 
Finance  W 
Maritime enforcements  X 
Police  Y 
Army  Z 
 
Source : Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam (2010a). 107 
 
Appendix 2A:  Information Letter 
 
Project Title:   Do Governments Pay Efficiency Wages? Evidence from the Malaysian 
Public Sector 
 
Investigator (s)           Dr Ranald Taylor 
Musa Ali 
 
Contact Person           Musa Ali 
Address  Murdoch Business School, Murdoch University, WA 
Telephone No.  (61) 0430292746 
 
 
 
You are invited to participate in this study. 
Background 
The relationship between wage, effort and motivation is one of the most important issues in 
managing human resources. In formulating a competitive wage level, which can motivate, 
attract  and  retain  high  calibre  employees  the  firm  should  not  only  make  the  internal 
alignment  but  also  carry  out  a  comparative  study  of  pay  levels  with  external  markets 
especially with its competitors. In this regard, a few studies have been conducted in some 
countries which show that the government pays a higher salary to their public servants as 
compared  to  their  counterpart  in  the  private  sector  and  it  has  significant  effect  to  the 
motivational level of the employees. We are interested to learn whether this is the case with 
the Malaysia higher education industry. 
 
In this survey, we will ask you to respond to a series of questions relating to your feelings 
towards  elements  in  public  service  motivation  such  as  attraction  to  policy  making, 
commitment to the public interest, compassion, self-sacrifice and effort. 
 
What Does Your Participation Involve? 
 
The survey asks you to respond to 26 statements and you can indicate your response by 
writing  the  appropriate  number  on  the  survey  form.  Please  return  the  completed 
questionnaire in the enclosed envelope. 
 
It is important that you understand that your involvement is this study is voluntary. While 
we  would  be  pleased  to  have  you  participate,  we  respect  your  right  to  decline.  All 
information will be treated in a confidential manner, and your name will not be used in any 
publication arising out of the research. All of the research will be kept in a locked cabinet at 
the Murdoch University South Street Campus, Room MBS 2.015. 108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do Governments Pay Efficiency Wages? 
Evidence from the Malaysian Public Sector 
Possible Benefits 
 
 
 
You may gain benefits by getting general information on the level of the public service 
motivation and the salary level as compared to your counterpart at the private companies. 
In  the  long  run,  this  study will  also  provide  recommendations  to  the  policy makers  in 
formulating decisions on salaries for the Malaysian public servants. 
 
 
 
Possible Risks 
 
There are no specific risks anticipated with your participation in this study. 
 
 
 
Questions 
 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study please feel free to contact either Musa 
Ali on 0430292746 or Dr Ranald Taylor on 93602533. Either one of us would be happy to 
discuss any aspect of the research with you. You are welcome to contact us at that any time 
to discuss any issues relating to the research study. 
 
Once we have analysed the information we will putting a brief finding report on the USM’s 
Human Resource Division website and look at the following website 
http://www.usm.my/ulatihan  in early 2012. 
 
We would like to thank you in advance for your assistance with this research project. We 
look forward to hearing from you soon. 
 
 
 
 
This study has been approved by the Murdoch University Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Approval 2010/214).  If you have any reservation or complaints about the ethical conduct of this 
research, and wish to talk with an independent person, you may contact Murdoch University’s 
Research Ethics Office for overseas studies, +61 8 9360 6677 or e-mail ethics@murdoch.edu.au. 
Any  issues  you  raise  will  be  treated  in  confidence  and  investigated  fully,  and  you  will  be 
informed of the outcome. 109 
 
Appendix 2B:  Participant consent and questionnaire 
 
Participant consent 
 
I have read the Information letter about the nature and scope of this survey. Any questions I 
have about the research process have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to take part 
in this research.  By submitting the survey into the enclosed envelope I give my consent for 
the results to be used in the research.   I am aware that this survey is anonymous and no 
personal details are being collected or used.  I know that I may change my mind, withdraw 
my consent, and stop participating at any time; and I acknowledge that once my survey has 
been submitted it may not be possible to withdraw my data. 
I understand that all information provided is treated as confidential by the researchers and 
will not be released to a third party unless required to do so by law. 
I  understand  that  the  findings  of  this  study  may  be  published  and  that no  information 
which can specifically identify me will be published. 
 
Persetujuan responden 
 
Saya  telah  membaca  surat  penerangan  tentang  bentuk  dan  skop  kajian  ini.  Segala 
persoalan yang timbul telah terjawap dengan baik. Saya bersetuju menyertai penyedilikan 
ini. Dengan mengemukakan borang soal selidik ini melalui sampul surat yang dikepilkan, 
saya memberi kebenaran untuk keputusan digunakan untuk kajian ini. Saya sedar bahawa 
penyertaan dalam kajian ini adalah secara sukarela dan tiada maklumat peribadi yang 
dikutip dan digunakan. Saya tahu yang saya  mungkin mengubah fikiran, menarik diri dan 
berundur dari menyetai penyedilikan ini pada bila- bila masa dan saya faham bila soal 
selidik  ini telah dikemukakan maka ianya tidak mungkin untuk saya menarik kembali data 
saya. 
Saya faham semua maklumat yang diberikan adalah dianggap sulit oleh penyelidilik dan 
tidak diberikan kepada pihak ketiga kecuali atas keperluan undang-undang untuk berbuat 
demikian. 
Saya faham penemuan kajian ini mungkin diterbitkan dan tiada maklumat yang mungkin 
dapat mengenal identiti diri saya akan diterbitkan. 
 
SECTION  A  - PERSONAL INFORMATION/ BAHAGIAN A  - MAKLUMAT DIRI 
 
For  the  following  questions,  please  indicate  your  response  by  putting  a  check  mark  (    )  in  the 
appropriate box. 
Bagi soalan-soalan berikut, sila nyatakan respons anda dengan menandakan tanda semak (  ) dalam kotak yang 
sesuai. 
 
 
1.  Gender/Jantina:  Male/Lelaki  Female/Perempuan 
 
 
 
2.  Your age now / 
Umur anda sekarang: 
years old/tahun 
 
3.  Race  Malay  Chinese  Indian 
Others/ Lain-lain Bangsa  Melayu  Cina  India 110 
 
4.  Your job’s classifications/ 
Klasifikasi kerja anda: 
 
 
 
Academic Staff/Staf Akademik 
 
Professor/Profesor 
 
Associate Professor/ Profesor Madya 
Senior Lecturer/ Pensyarah Kanan 
Lecturer/ Pensyarah 
Administrative Staff /Staf  Pentadbiran 
 
Managerial and Professional/ 
Pengurusan dan  Profesional (Gred 41-54) 
 
Supporting 1/ Sokongan 1 (Gred 17-38) 
 
Supporting 2/ Sokongan 2 (Gred 1-16) 
 
 
 
5. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Apakah kelayakan akademik tertinggi yang anda capai? 
 
SRP/SPM 
STPM/Diploma 
Bachelor degree/ijazah sarjana muda 
 
Master degree/ijazah sarjana 
 
Ph.D 
 
 
 
6. State your length of employment with USM  years/tahun 
Nyatakan berapa lamakah anda sudah bekerja dengan USM 111 
 
SECTION B  - Public Service Motivation  BAHAGIAN B – Motivasi Perkhidmatan 
Awam 
 
  Given below are statements reflecting the feelings of people toward their public services motivation. Please read 
each of them carefully and indicate how much do you agree/disagree with the statements by circle the appropriate 
number at the right of the statements. Use the following scheme for your responses: 
 
Berikut adalah pernyataan yang menggambarkan perasaan terhadap motivasi perkhidmatan awam. Sila baca dengan teliti 
dan nyatakan  kesetujuan atau  ketidaksetujuan  anda  terhadap   pernyataan  tersebut  dengan  menanda bulat  nombor  yang 
bersesuaian di sebelah kanan pernyataan tersebut. Gunakan skema berikut bagi menyatakan respons  anda: 
 
Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
Sangat Tidak Bersetuju  Tidak Bersetuju  Neutral  Bersetuju  Sangat 
Bersetuju 
  
ATTRACTION TO POLICY MAKING 
TARIKAN  KEPADA PENGUBALAN  DASAR 
 
  
PSM1:  Politics is a dirty word 
Politik suatu perkataan yang kotor. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
  
PSM2:  The give and take of public policy making doesn’t appeal 
to me 
Ketidakseriusan  dalam pengubalan dasar awam  bukanlah 
sesuatu yang boleh saya terima. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
 
 
PSM3:  I don’t care much for politicians 
Saya tidak begitu kesah tentang ahli politik. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
  
COMMITMENT TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
KOMITMEN  TERHADAP KEPENTINGAN  AWAM 
 
  
PSM4: It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going 
on in my community 
Adalah  sukar untuk saya berminat sepenuhnya dengan apa 
jua perkara yang berlaku dalam komuniti saya. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
  
PSM5:  I unselfishly contribute to my community 
Saya tidak pernah berkira dalam menyumbang bakti kepada 
komuniti saya 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 112 
 
 
 
PSM6:  I consider public service my civic duty 
Saya menganggap perkhidmatan awam adalah  suatu 
tanggungjawab sivik. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM7:  Meaningful public service is very important to me 
Perkhidmatan awam yang bermakna adalah  sangat penting 
kepada saya. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM8:  I would prefer seeing public officials do what is  best for 
the whole community even if it harmed my interests. 
Saya lebih suka melihat penjawat awam melaksanakan 
perkara yang terbaik untuk seluruh komuniti walaupun ia 
menggugat minat saya. 
 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
COMPASSION 
BELAS KASIHAN 
 
 
PSM9:  It is difficult for me to contain my  feelings when I see 
people in distress 
Sukar bagi saya mengawal perasaan apabila  melihat 
mereka yang dalam  kesukaran 
 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM10: Most social programs are too vital to do without. 
Kebanyakan program sosial perlu  dilaksanakan kerana ia 
terlalu penting. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM11:  I am often reminded by daily events how dependent 
we are on one another 
Saya sering diingatkan oleh peristiwa yang 
berlaku seharian bertapa kita saling bergantung 
antara satu sama lain. 
 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM12:  I am rarely moved by the plight  of the underprivileged 
Saya jarang bertindak disebabkan rasa pahit getir kerana 
keadaan kurang bernasib baik. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM13:  To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others. 
Bagi saya, patriotisme termasuk prihatin akan kebajikan 
orang lain. 
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PSM14:  I have little compassion for people in  need who are 
unwilling to take the first step to help themselves 
Saya mempunyai sedikit rasa belas kasihan  kepada orang 
yang tidak mahu berusaha membantu diri sendiri. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM15:  There are few public programs  that I wholeheartedly 
support. 
Terdapat beberapa program awam yang saya sokong 
sepenuh hati. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM16:   I seldom think about the welfare  of people I don’t know 
personally. 
Saya jarang memikirkan tentang kebajikan orang lain 
yang saya tidak begitu mengenalinya. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
SELF-SACRIFICE 
PENGORBANAN DIRI 
 
 
PSM17:  Doing well financially is definitely more important to 
me than doing good deeds 
Kedudukan kewangan yang baik sememangnya lebih 
penting bagi saya daripada melakukan kerja kebajikan. 
 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM18:  Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself. 
Kebanyakan perkara yang saya lakukan adalah untuk 
imbuhan yang lebih besar bagi diri saya. 
. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM19:  Serving other citizens would give me a good feeling even 
if no one paid me for it. 
Berbakti untuk orang lain akan memberi perasaan 
menyenangkan hati saya walaupun tidak ada sesiapa 
yang membayar saya. 
 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM20:  Making a difference in society means  more to me than 
personal achievements 
Melakukan sesuatu perubahan dalam masyarakat adalah 
lebih bermakna bagi saya berbanding dengan pencapaian 
diri sendiri 
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PSM21:  I think people should give back to society more than 
they get from it. 
Saya berpendapat orang ramai sepatutnya memberi 
sumbangan yang lebih kepada masyarakat  berbanding 
dengan  yang mereka terima daripadanya. 
 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM22:  I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of 
society 
Saya bersedia untuk melakukan pengorbanan yang besar 
untuk kebaikan masyarakat. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM23:  I am one of those rare people who would risk personal 
loss to help someone else. 
Saya adalah di antara mereka yang jarang mengambil 
risiko kerugian diri sendiri  bagi membantu orang lain. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
PSM24:  I believe in putting duty before self 
Saya percaya akan keutamaan  tugas melebihi diri sendiri. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
EFFORT 
USAHA 
 
E 1 :  I always put as much effort as I possibly could when 
completing my  work task 
Saya sentiasa berusaha segigih yang boleh apabila enyiapkan 
tugas saya. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
MONETARY REWARD 
GANJARAN KEWANGAN 
 
E 2  :  I should be rewarded (monetarily) when exerting 
higher efforts while doing my job 
Saya sepatutnya  diberi ganjaran (kewangan) apabila 
menunjukkan usaha yang lebih semasa melaksanakan tugas 
saya. 
 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
 
I sincerely thank you for your time and cooperative in completing this questionnaire. Please check to ensure that you have not left out any 
question and return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed envelope. 
Saya mengucapkan ribuan terima kasih kepada anda kerana sudi meluangkan masa dan bekerjasama dalam melengkapkan soal selidik ini. Sila periksa untuk 
memanstikan yang anda tidak meninggalkan sebarang soalan dan kembalikan soal selidik yang lengkap dalam sampul surat yang disediakan. 115 
 
Appendix 3A:  The salary scales for academic staff in the Malaysian public HEIs 
 
 
Positions  Grade/salaries code  Basic monthly salary range  Fixed monthly allowances 
Lecturer  DS 45  RM 2546 – RM 6113 
(USD 848 –  USD 2037) 
Entertainment allowance :  RM  500 
(USD 166) 
Housing allowance  :  RM 700 
(USD 233) 
DU 45  RM 2857 – RM 6285 
(USD 952 – USD 2095) 
Senior 
Lecturer 
DS 51/52  RM 4573 - RM 7029 
(USD 1524 – USD 2343) 
Entertainment allowance :  RM 600 
(USD 200) 
Housing allowance :  RM 700 
(USD 233) 
  DU51/52  RM 4994 – RM 7035 
(USD 1664 – USD 2345) 
Associate 
Professor 
DS 53/54  RM 4842 – RM 7448 
(USD 1524 – USD  2343) 
Entertainment allowance :   RM 800 
(USD 266) 
Housing allowance :  RM 900 
(USD  300)    DU 53/54  RM 5319 – RM 7551 
(USD 1773 – USD 2517) 
Professor  Premier Grade C 
(VK 7) 
RM 6595-  RM 9480 
(USD 2198 – USD 3160) 
 
Special grade allowance : RM  1000 – 
RM 3000 (USD 333 – USD 1000) 
 
Entertainment allowance : RM 2500 – 
RM 5200 (USD 833 – USD 1733) 
Housing allowance :  RM  1300- RM 
2500 (USD 433 – USD 833) 
  Premier Grade B 
(VK 6) 
RM 7145 – RM 10270 
(USD 2381 – USD 3423) 
  Premier Grade A 
(VK 5) 
RM7766 – RM11164 
(USD 2588 – USD 3721) 
  Turus III 
(VU4) 
RM 8625 – RM 12523 
(USD 2875 – USD 4174) 
  Turus II 
(VU3) 
RM 9483 –RM13770 
(USD 3161 – USD 4590) 
  Turus I 
(VU2) 
RM10300 –RM14955 
(USD 3433– USD  4985) 
 
 
Source : Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam (2007a; 2007b; 2010d) 116 
 
Appendix 3B:  The salary scales of non- academic staff in the Malaysian public HEIs 
 
 
 
Job groups  Grade/salaries 
code 
Salary    ranges  Fixed monthly allowances 
Managerial and 
Professional 
Grade 
41 to 54 
RM 1690 – RM 7331 
(USD 563 – USD  2443) 
Public service/Entertainment 
allowance: RM  300 – RM 800 
(USD 100- USD 266 ) 
Housing allowance  : 
RM  250  -  900  (USD  83  –  USD 
300) 
Supporting 1  Grade 
17 to 40 
RM 820  – RM 4911 
(USD 275 – USD 1637) 
Public service allowance :  RM 
115 – RM 220(USD 38  – USD 73 
) 
Housing  allowance  :   RM   180 
(USD 60) 
Supporting 2  Grade 
1-16 
RM 649 – RM 2209 
(USD 216 – USD  679) 
Public service allowance :  RM  95 
(USD 31) 
Housing  allowance  :   RM   180 
(USD 60) 
 
Source: Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam ( 2007a, 2010d) 
Note: The figures are based on the administration (N) salary scale and including the promotion post in job 
group. 117 
 
Appendix 4A:  The salary scales in the Malaysian private HEIs 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.curtin.edu.my/staff/academic_salary.htm(Retrieved on 4/1/2011) 118 
 
Appendix 4B:  The  salary scales in the Malaysian private HEIs 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.swinburne.edu.my/hr/salary-scale.htm (Retrieved on 4/1/2011) 119 
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Appendix 6A:  Letter  of approval to conduct a survey  from USM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date    25th October 2010 
 
 
Mr_ Musa bin Ali 
Blbis Place 
Willetton 6155 
Western Austral;a 
 
 
Dear Mr. Musa_ 
 
APPUCATION  TO CONDUCT A SURVEY ON THE STAFF OF USM 
 
With reference to your letter dated 14 October 2010 regarding the above mentioned 
 
2.  We are  pleased  to  inform  you  that the  University  has  no  obfection for  you to 
conduct a survey on the staff of USM for your research study as mentioned in your letter 
 
Thank you. 
 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
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Appendix 6B: Ethic approval from Murdoch University 
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Appendix 7:  Response rate based on the job classification, USM, Malaysia 
 
 
 
Job classification  Distributed  Returned  Response rate 
(%) 
Professor  9  9  100 
Associate Professor  27  27  100 
Senior Lecturer  55  41  74.5 
Lecturer  15  8  53.3 
Management and Professional  56  56  100 
Supporting  1  256  219  85.5 
Supporting  2  182  97  53.3 
Total  600  457  76.1 
 